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I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT. 
This case proceeds from a grant of summaryjudgment in favor of CCD, L.C. ("CCD") 
in a civil case by a district court. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j), this Court has 
appellate jurisdiction. 
IL ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD FOR 
APPELLATE REVIEW. 
Issues Presented for Appeal: 
There are three issues raised by the appeal. The first issue for appeal is whether under 
the facts of this case appellant Christopher Lynn Millsap's ("Millsap") attempt to withdraw 
as a member of appellee CCD terminated his membership and therefore the exp ulsion 
provision of Section 48-2c-710(3) of Utah Code Ann. does not apply to him because it only 
applies to members? 
The second issue for appeal is whether the trial court correctly ruled that the well 
recognized doctrine of first to breach rule under contract law barred appellant Millsap from 
enforcing any rights he had under the CCD operating agreement ("Operating Agreement") 
and the amendment thereto ("Amendment" and collectively with the Operating Agreement 
referred to as "Amended Operating Agreement"), by his wrongful use of CCD's trust account 
after the Amendment was signed, and, whether, consequently, Millsap is barred from 
enforcing the Amended Operating Agreement, including any right to retire and thereby 
withdraw from CCD and the prohibition of expulsion contained therein? 
The third issue, which is a corollary to the first two issues, is whether the trial court 
properly ruled that Millsap's material breaches of the Amended Operating Agreement 
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precluded him from claiming that CCD and its other members waived the right to expel him 
for his wrongful acts that occurred after the execution of the Amendment? 
Standards for Appellate Review: 
Millsap's appeal is from the trial court's denial of his motion for summary judgment 
and its ruling in favor of CCD's cross-motion for summary judgment. When there are no 
genuine issues of material facts and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law summary judgment should be granted. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). A trial court's legal 
conclusions are reviewed for correctness. Standard Fed. Sav. & Loan v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 
1136, 1137 (Utah 1991). On an appeal from summary judgment, the appellate court 
considers "only two questions: whether the lower court erred in (1) applying the governing 
law, and (2) holding that no material facts were in dispute." Nelson v. Salt Lake City, 919 
P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1996) {quoting Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746, 749 
(Utah 1983)); see also Hill, 2001 UT 16 at PI2. 
When reviewing whether the trial court correctly found there were no genuine issues 
of material fact, this Court "accept[s] the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party." Winegarv. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991) (citations 
omitted); see also Estate Landscaping & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. v. Mountain States 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 844 P.2d322, 324 n.l (Utah 1992) (clarifying that court should review facts 
in light most favorable to nonmoving party, not the losing party). On appeal the Court 
"view[s] the facts somewhat differently when reviewing the trial court's rulings on the 
separate summary judgment motions." Id. Thus, in reviewing the trial court's denial of 
Millsap's motion for summary judgment, the facts are viewed in a light most favorable to 
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CCD. In reviewing the trial court's ruling on CCD's cross-motion for summary judgment, 
this Court reviews the facts in the light most favorable to Millsap. "The law requires that, 
as miich as is possible, the trial court view the facts and reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom • most favorable to tl ic nonn lovii igpai ty It does i loti equirei mreasonable 
factual inferences, nor does it require that the com t tuni a blind eye to reasonable inferences 
on uncontested facts." Surety Underwriters v.E&STrucking, 10 P.3d338,345 (Utah2000) 
(holding that the rule does not prohibit a court from drawing reasonable inferences from 
uncontested tails e\en il tlte\ ;ue mila\ou . • -ovinp narty.) 
Additionally, this Court "will not consi* T the fart . • . ipeal whei i tl lei e is i i.o record 
the trial judge had access to those facts when deciding the motion at issue." Govert Copier 
Painting v. Craig Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 170 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citing Conder v. 
A.L. Williams and Assoc, 739 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah Ct Vpp 1990) Finally, the summary ' 
judgment Millsap appeals from may be affirmed 
if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent from the record, even 
though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be 
the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or 
theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower 
coiirt, and was considered or passed on by the lower court. 
Bailey v. Bayles, 52 P.3d 1158, 1161 (Utah 2002) {quotingDipoma v. McPhie, 2001 29 P.3d 
1225 (Utah 2001) (other citations omitted)). 
III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES. 
The following arc the determinative statiites and rules implicated by Millsap's appeal 
each of which are contained witl iii I the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act, Utah 
Code Ann. Sections 48-2c-101 et seq (the "Act") or the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
.1 
A. UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-120(f); 
B. UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-502; 
C. UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-708; 
D. UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-709; 
E. UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-710; 
F. UTAH CODE ANN. §48-2C- 1102; 
G. UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1901; and 
H. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c) and (e). 
See Addendum Exhibit A, which is a copy of these statutes and rules. 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
Craig Newman ("Newman"), Doug Stanley ("Stanley"), and Millsap formed CCD on 
October 1, 1994, by signing CCD's Articles of Organization and the related Operating 
Agreement on that date. The parties agreed that St. George, Utah would be CCD's principal 
place of business and that Millsap would act as CCD's "manager for the day-to-day affairs 
of the Company." [Record on Appeal ("R.") at 301,327, Operating Agreement \ 7(A).] The 
Operating Agreement also provided that Millsap would work full-time in CCD's St. George 
offices and that Newman and Stanley would work "primarily in Salt Lake County." [R. 327, 
Operating Agreement at ^ 7(B).] Thus, Millsap was entrusted with running the operations 
of the business away from the day to day supervision of the other members of CCD. 
The purpose of the parties agreeing to form CCD was to engage in the title insurance 
business. As part of the statutory requirements to conduct business as a title insurance 
agency in the State of Utah, CCD was required to establish a trust account ("Trust Account") 
into which is deposited all funds for settlement of closings of real estate transactions and 
other matters in which CCD acts as an escrow agent. When CCD receives money to be 
deposited into the Trust Account it assigns a file number for the depositor's account. The 
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file number is the basis of accounting for all funds that are received and disbursed for a 
particular transaction for that client. 
The Operating Agreement contains two provisions that are germane to this appeal. 
First Section 13 provides tl lat "No member maybe expelled 1 i cu 1 1 the Company by act or 
desire of tl ic 1 ei 1 mil lii ig n icn lbci s." [R. 334, Operating Agi eci nei it at % 1.3 ] IV loi eo\ ei tl ie 
Operating Agreement contains a provision that upon the retirement of a member CCD has 
the right to acquire the retiring member's interest, and if \\ did not elect to do so the 
remaining members would have the opporttinity to acquire the interest. If neither the 
coi t ipany nor its 1 ei 1 1a.i1 lit ig 1 :t ici 1 ibers elect to pi i rehase tl ie ii: itei est tl ici 1. "the Company shall 
be wound up and all its properties distributed in liquidation. . . ." [R. 331-332, Operating 
Agreement at 12(B).] Section 16 of the Operating Agreement also provides that CCD shall 
be dissolved upon the retirement of a member unless his interest was purchased in 
accordance with Sectioi1 12(B). [R. 335, Operating Agreement.] 
In March, 2000, Newman and Stanley discovered that Millsap wrongfully took over 
$625,000 from the Trust Account and used that money to finance the Pheasant Meadow 
Subdivision located in Washington County ("Pheasant Meadow Property"), a development 
in which he had an ownership interest. [R. 292, Stanley Affd at |^ 4; R. 301-302, Newman 
Affd at \ 9.] After Millsap admitted to Newman and Stanley that Millsap took funds from 
the Trust Account, on April 21sl, 2000, the parties agreed to amend the Operating Agreement 
to prevent Millsap from having access to the Trust Account and to minimize his involvement 
with the company while he repaid the amounts he took from the accoun .^ . 31 1, Newman 
Affd at |^ 16; R. 418, Amendment.] In connection with the Amendment, Newman agreed 
to lend Millsap money ("Newman Loan") to be used to repay the Trust Account for money 
Millsap wrongfully took. [R. 311, Newman Affd; R. 414-16, which is a copy of the 
Promissory Note.] The Amendment expressly stated Millsap was not authorized "to 
withdraw funds from CCD's general or escrow accounts." [R. 311, Newman Affd; 419, 
Amendment at ^ J B.] Paragraph B of the Amendment also eliminated any rights Millsap had 
under Section 12(B) of the Operating Agreement in the event that he were to die, retire or his 
employment with CCD were terminated. [R. 419, Amendment at |^ B.] The parties agreed, 
however, that if Millsap timely repaid the Newman Loan, and the Operating Agreement was 
not thereafter modified within a year after repayment of the loan, the modifications to the 
Operating Agreement set forth in paragraphs B and C thereof would be of no further force 
or effect "and the terms of the Operating Agreement shall thereafter be binding upon the 
parties." [R. 420, Amendment at ^  C] Almost immediately after the Amendment was signed 
Millsap began to misuse the Trust Account in breach of the Amended Operating Agreement. 
Course of Proceeding and Disposition of the Trial Court: 
On March 6, 2002, Millsap moved for summary judgment claiming that because he 
retired he was no longer a member of CCD. Consequently, he claims that because he is not 
a member he could not be expelled as a member of CCD under UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-
710, because it only applies to members. Alternatively, he argued that the Amendment 
provides that because he timely repaid the Newman Loan, all of the conditions precedent 
have been met for his alleged rights to be reinstated under the Operating Agreement as 
provided under paragraph C of the Amendment. 
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On March 27, 2002, CCD filed a cross-motion for summary judgment pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. Section 48-2c-710 which provides that a company may seek to expel a 
member who has materially breached the operating agreement or engaged in wrongful 
conduct adversely and materially affecting the company's business. In support of its cross-
motion, CCD laid out in painstaking detail Millsap's breaches of CCD's Amended Operating 
Agreement, both before and after execution of the Amendment. CCD's cross-motion and 
the facts showing Millsap's misuse of funds from CCD's trust account were supported by the 
Affidavits of Newman and Stanley, together with supporting documentation. 
Millsap filed an opposition memorandum to CCD's cross-motion, but did not file an 
affidavit or other evidence that disputed CCD's undisputed statement of facts. CCD 
contended that Millsap's wrongful behavior both before and after the Amendment was signed 
constituted grounds for expelling him as a member because he breached both the Operating 
Agreement and the Amended Operating Agreement. Millsap's wrongful conduct, therefore, 
constituted material breaches of the Amended Operating Agreement that adversely and 
materially affected the company's business, which is based upon the trust of its customers. 
CCD argued that any right Millsap had under the Amendment to reinstatement of the 
prohibition against expulsion under Section 13 and any right to retire under Section 12(B) 
of the Operating Agreement were unenforceable for several reasons. First, CCD argued that 
the Act clearly allowed a company to seek the expulsion of a member regardless of any 
alleged voluntarily withdrawal. As an alternative and consistent common law theory, CCD 
also moved for summary judgment based upon the doctrine of the first to breach rule. CCD 
argued that Millsap could not enforce the Amended Operating Agreement because his 
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manipulation of the Trust Account after the Amendment was signed constituted material 
breaches of the Amended Operating Agreement. Consequently, any right Millsap had to 
retire as a member thereunder was ineffective because under the first to breach doctrine, 
Millsap was powerless to enforce any of his contractual rights. Because he could not enforce 
the Amended Operating Agreement he was powerless to withdraw fro m C CD. H e i s, 
therefore, a member of CCD and is subject to the expulsion for his material breaches of the 
Amended Operating Agreement. 
Finally, CCD argued that Newman and Stanley were fraudulently induced to enter into 
the Amendment. Consequently, the Amendment was unenforceable and any right to reinstate 
Millsap to all of his rights under the Amended Operating Agreement was void. The trial 
court denied summaryjudgment on that ground stating there were disputed issues of material 
facts about whether an accounting prepared by Millsap that he gave to Newman and Stanley 
that purported to show the extent of Millsap's misuse of the Trust Account was a 
representation that it was the entire extent of his misuse of Trust Account funds or an 
estimate. 
On June 6, 2002, during oral argument on the pending motions for summary 
judgment, the trial court granted CCD's cross-motion for summary judgment, and 
accordingly, denied Millsap's motion. [See Transcript of June 6, 2002 hearing at 28-30.] 
Pursuant to the trial court's request, CCD submitted proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. On July 2, 2002, Millsap submitted his Objections to Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Motion for Reconsideration, and Memorandum 
in Support ("Motion to Reconsider"). [R. 552-528, Motion to Reconsider.] Together with 
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Millsap's Motion to Reconsider, he submitted an Affidavit, dated July 2, 2002, wherein he 
attempted, for the first time, to raise issues of fact regarding whether he had materially 
breached the Amendment to the Operating Agreement. [R. 531-532.] He argued, therefore, 
that CCD waived the right to claim that his signing checks drawn on the Trust Account were 
material breaches of the Amendment. Millsap's assertion, however, fails for two reasons. 
First, it is tardy. He failed to raise the issue in connection with his opposition to CCD's 
cross-motion for summary judgment. In addition, his affidavit does not state, nor could it, 
that Newman and Stanley knew that the checks signed by Millsap were in fact additional 
manipulations of Trust Account funds in violation of the Amended Operating Agreement. 
On August 29,2002, the trial court denied Millsap's motion and entered the proposed 
Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law on September 3, 2002, and summary judgment 
in favor of CCD. [R. 585,586-590.] The trial court agreed with CCD's argument, that under 
the facts of this case, Millsap had no right to retire because of the Act's explicit allowance 
that a company may seek a member's expulsion. Additionally, the trial court found that 
Millsap's material breaches of the Amended Operating Agreement precluded him from 
enforcing the terms of that agreement against CCD pursuant to the first to breach rule. 
Millsap has appealed the trial court's refusal to grant his motion for summary judgment and 
the trial court's ruling granting CCD's motion for summary judgment. The trial court 
properly expelled Millsap from CCD. 
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The following is a summary of CCD's statement of facts, that were set forth in its 
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment, and undisputed by Millsap: 
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1. CCD was formed on October 1,1994, pursuant to the Articles of Organization 
of CDC, L.C. CCD's Articles of Organization was signed by all of its members, Millsap, 
Newman and Stanley. On that same date all CCD members signed the related Operating 
Agreement. The Operating Agreement identifies Newman, Stanley and Millsap as members 
of CCD. [R. 300-301, Newman Aff d at ffil 6, 7 and 8; R. 324-341, Exhibit 2, Operating 
Agreement.] 
2. CCD i s e ngaged i n t he t itle i nsurance b usiness. A s p art o f t he st atutory 
requirements to conduct business as a title insurance agency in the State of Utah, CCD was 
required to establish the Trust Account into which is deposited all funds for settlement of 
closings of real estate transactions and other matters in which CCD acts as an escrow agent. 
When CCD receives money to be deposited in the Trust Account it assigns a file number for 
the depositor's account. The file number is the basis of accounting for all funds that are ' 
received and disbursed for a particular transaction for that client. [R. 300, Newman Aff d. 
at UU 4 and 5.] 
3. The Operating Agreement provided that the initial manager of CCD would be 
Millsap who would work full time in St. George, Utah running its day-to-day operations. He 
had access to the Trust Account, was authorized as a signatory on that account and was 
licensed as an escrow agent under Utah law. While an employee of CCD, Millsap was 
primarily responsible for the management and operation of the Trust Account. [R. 301, 327, 
Newman Aff d at ^ | 7 and 8, and Exhibit 2, which is the Operating Agreement at |^ 7(A).] 
4. Section 7(E)(vii) of the Operating Agreement provides that "No Member, 
without the majority consent of the Members, shall: use the name, credit or property of the 
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Company for any purpose other than a proper Company purpose." Likewise, Section 
7(E)(viii) of the Operating Agreement forbids any member from engaging in "any act 
detrimental to the Company business or which would make it impossible to carry on 
business." [R. 328-329, Operating Agreement at § 7(E).] 
5. In approximately March, 2000, Newman and Stanley discovered that Millsap 
wrongfully took over $625,000 from the Trust Account and used that money to finance the 
Pheasant Meadow Property located in Washington County. Millsap admitted to Newman 
that Millsap withdrew monies from the Trust Account for use in connection with 
development of the Pheasant Meadow Property, that was owned, in part, by Defendant The 
Chris and Sandra Millsap Family Trust of which Millsap is a beneficiary. [R. 301 -302,303-
306, Newman Aff d at ffif 9 and 12.] 
6. In March 2000, after Newman discovered that Millsap took money from the ' 
Trust Account, Millsap gave Newman and Stanley a handwritten accounting he prepared 
("Millsap Accounting") in which he purported to identify unauthorized funds he withdrew 
from the Trust Account and deposits he claimed he made into the Trust Account to repay a 
portion of the monies he took. [R. 302-306, Newman Aff d at ffi[ 11 and 12; R. 343-345, 
Millsap Accounting; R. 347-348, Millsap Accounting that was typed; R. 350, Explanation 
of Millsap Accounting.] 
7. Millsap initially misappropriated at least $625,000 from the Trust Account. 
[R. 303-306, Newman Aff d at U 12; R. 352-378, Exhibits 6 through 19 thereto, that are 
copies of the unauthorized checks drawn upon the Trust Account by Millsap.] 
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8. On March 4, 2000, a special meeting of the members of CCD was held 
("Special Meeting") to discuss Millsap's unauthorized use of funds on deposit in the Trust 
Account. All members attended the meeting. During the Special Meeting the members 
discussed repayment of the amounts he took from the Trust Account. Minutes of the Special 
Meeting ("Minutes") were prepared and signed by him. During the meeting he agreed to 
execute a trust deed note in favor of CCD securing "the Trust Account discrepancies. . . . " 
[R. 380, Exhibit 20 of the Newman Aff d, which is a copy of the Minutes.] The Minutes 
state that during the Special Meeting Millsap "admitted diverting trust funds for personal 
use to his real estate development known as Pheasant Meadow Subdivision." [R. 3 06, 
Newman Aff d at Tf 13; R. 380-381, Minutes.] 
9. Newman agreed to lend Millsap $493,965.04 pursuant to a promissory note, 
dated April 21, 2000 ("Note"), to enable him to eliminate the deficiency in the Trust 
Account. The amount of the Note was exactly the amount Millsap showed was the 
deficiency in the Trust Account in the Millsap Accounting. In connection with the execution 
of the Note, on April 21st, 2000, all members of CCD executed the Amendment to the 
Operating Agreement of CCD, L.C.'s Members ("Amendment"). [R. 311, Newman Aff d 
at I) 16; R. 414-416, 418-421, Exhibits 24 and 25 of the Newman Aff d.] 
10. At the time Millsap's misuses of the Trust Account were discovered in March 
2000, he agreed with Newman and Stanley not to have any further involvement with the 
Trust Account, including directing the use or signing of any checks drawn upon that account. 
Moreover, in the Amendment Millsap agreed he would "have no authority to withdraw funds 
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from CCD's general or escrow accounts." [R. 311, Newman Aff d. at f 17; R. 418-421, 
Exhibit 25 of the Newman Aff d., which is a copy of the Amendment at J^ 8.] 
11. At the request of the Utah State Insurance Department in January 2001, 
Newman began investigating the sources of deposits shown on the Millsap Accounting that 
Millsap claimed he made to repay the Trust Account. Newman's investigation of the 
Millsap Accounting revealed that Millsap misstated the amount of missing funds from the 
Trust Account in the amount of approximately $11,000 by showing in the Millsap 
Accounting payments to the Trust Account that were in fact merely transfers of moneys from 
other Trust Account depositors and refunds of property taxes belonging to other depositors. 
[R. 306-310, Newman Aff d l^ 14.] 
12. After Millsap's misuse of funds deposited in the Trust Account was discovered 
and after the Amendment was signed, Millsap again began to manipulate funds on deposit 
in the account for his personal benefit. For example, he used CCD's customer file number 
10449 ("Gren Account Number") for later transactions involving his company Gren 
Development. Originally that account file number was used for a commitment for title 
insurance for a construction loan made by Sandra I. Jones and Veral Isom to Gren 
Development in the amount of $50,000 ("Isom Loan"). The Isom Loan was secured by a 
trust deed (Gren Trust Deed). Pursuant to the Gren Trust Deed, Gren Development was the 
trustor, Sandra I. Jones and Verla Isom were the beneficiaries and United Title Services of 
Utah, Inc. was the trustee. The Isom Loan secured by the Gren Trust Deed funded on 
March 7lh, 2000. On April 25th, just four days after the Amendment was signed, a wire 
transfer in the amount of $45,000 was made into the Trust Account that was accounted for 
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under the previously closed Gren Account Number. The deposit slip states the funds came 
from Pat Dixon. [R. 311-312, Newman Aff d at f^ 18; R. 433, Exhibit 31 which is a copy of 
the check.] On that same day Millsap endorsed check number 39619 drawn upon the Trust 
Account made payable to Gren Development ("Gren Check") in the same amount. [R. 437, 
Exhibit 33 of Newman Aff d, a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit B.] 
The use of the same file number for separate transactions violated CCD's policy for 
accounting for such transactions. [R. 311-312, Newman Aff d at^ f 18; R. 423-435, Exhibits 
26 through 32 attached thereto.] Millsap admits in his statement of facts at Paragraph 
34(b)(iii) that these checks were written for his personal use, and thus, in violation of his 
obligations under the Amended Operating Agreement. [R. 478, Millsap's Responses to 
CCD's Statement of Undisputed Facts, see also Brief of Appellant ("Millsap Brief), at 15-
16.] 
13. Another incident in which Millsap signed checks drawn upon the Trust 
Account that constituted a wrongful use of that account occurred after he signed the 
Amendment. The incident occurred on September 29, 2000, in connection with the sale of 
real estate ("Ford Property") by Shelly Reynolds-Ford to Milton L. Tippetts. The sale of the 
Ford Property was closed ("Tippetts Closing") using CCD as the escrow agent. Pat Dixon 
held a deed of trust ("Dixon Trust Deed") that encumbered the Ford Property. United Title 
Services of Utah, Inc. was the trustee of the Dixon Trust Deed. Newman was the owner of 
United Title Services of Utah, Inc. and routinely signed deeds of reconveyances of trust 
deeds. Line 504 of the settlement statement for the Tippetts Closing showed that $81,271.91 
was to be disbursed to Pat Dixon from the sales proceeds. [R. 448, check in the amount of 
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$81,271.91, a copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit C] Check number 
42600, in the amount of $81,271.91 ("First Check"), was prepared in connection with that 
closing. Millsap signed the First Check. [R. 448.] A copy of the First Check was sent to 
Newman in the ordinary course of business. [R. 312-313, Newman Aff d, at f^ 18.] That 
check was sent to him to induce him to cause United Title Services of Utah, Inc. to execute 
a deed of reconveyance for the Dixon Trust Deed thereby releasing the subject property from 
that encumbrance. After receiving a copy of the First check Newman immediately began 
to investigate whether Millsap was using the Trust Account in violation of the Amendment. 
Newman discovered that Millsap voided the First Check and in its stead caused two checks 
to be issued, the total amount of which equaled the amount of the First Check. One of the 
new checks was payable to Gren Development, Millsap's company, dated October 3,2000, 
in the amount of $70,000 ("Second Check"), signed by Millsap, and the other check was 
payable to Dixon dated October 3, 2000, in the amount of $ 11,271.91 ("Third Check"), also 
signed by Millsap. [R. 312-313, Newman Aff d at |^ 19; R. 439-454, copies of these checks 
are attached as Addendum Exhibit D.] Gren Development was not even identified as a party 
in any respect to the Tippetts Closing. [R. 312, Newman Aff d at t 19; R. 439-454, 
Exhibits 34 through 39 attached thereto.] 
14. On October 13,2000, after discovering Millsap's new unauthorized uses of the 
Trust Account, Newman terminated Millsap's employment with CCD. [R. 313, Newman 
Affdat1|20.] 
15. On May 18, 2001, Millsap's license as an escrow agent issued by the Utah 
Insurance Department was revoked, pursuant to the Stipulation & Order of the Department. 
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[R. 314, Newman Aff d at ^ 21; R. 460-464, Exhibit 41 attached thereto, which is a copy of 
the Stipulation & Order.] 
16. Newman has never verbally or in writing given his consent to Millsap 
withdrawing as a member of CCD. [R. 314, Newman Aff d at ^ 22.] 
17. As recently as July, 6, 2001, Millsap has demanded involvement in CCD's 
business. Through his counsel David Carter, Millsap stated he "was becoming increasingly 
concerned about the management of the company and its failure to observe [his] membership 
rights and to communicate with and appropriately involve [him]" in CCD's business affairs. 
[R. 314, Newman Aff d at ^ | 23; R. 466-467, Exhibit 43, which is a copy of the letter sent by 
Mr. Carter.] M oreover, o n S eptember 7, 2 001, M illsap's c ounsel d emanded e xtensive 
financial information concerning CCD based upon Millsap's alleged rights under the 
Operating Agreement. [R. 314, Newman Aff d. at ^  24; R. 469, Exhibit 44, which is a copy 
of Millsap's counsel's letter.] 
18. On July 16th 2001, the State of Utah filed a criminal information statement 
against Millsap alleging 13 counts of unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary and one 
count of racketeering ("Information"). [See R. 273-290, attached as Exhibit B to CCD's 
Summary Judgment Memorandum.] On March 6, 2002, Millsap plead guilty to five counts 
of third degree felony involving the Trust Account ("Statement") set forth in the Information. 
[See R. 263-271, attached as Exhibit A to CCD's Summary Judgment Memorandum.] In his 
Statement he plead guilty to counts one through five of the Information. Counts one through 
five of the Information are for unlawful use of funds taken from the Trust Account that are 
evidenced by five checks. Those checks correspond directly with the checks listed in the 
Millsap Accounting, which are also identified in Newman's Affidavit as funds wrongfully 
taken from the Trust Account. [See R. 263-290, Statement of Defendant; 303-304, Newman 
Aff d. at fflf 12c, d, e, f, and g; and R. 343-345, Exhibit 3 thereto, which is a copy of the 
Millsap Accounting.] 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. 
This Court should uphold the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
CCD expelling Millsap as a member. The undisputed evidence establishes beyond any doubt 
that Millsap materially breached the Operating Agreement both before and after signing the 
Amendment. Indeed, Millsap concedes that he misused over $625,000 of Trust Account 
funds prior to signing the Amendment, and again wrote two checks after signing the 
Amendment for his personal use totaling approximately $115,000. [R. 476-478, Millsap's 
Responses to CCD's Statement of Undisputed Facts at ffl| 4, 11 and 12.] Millsap's misuse ' 
of the Trust Account for his individual purposes resulted in the revocation of his escrow 
agent's license and a guilty plea to five felony counts. Millsap's wrongful actions have 
damaged CCD's goodwill which is based upon the trust of its customers. Thus, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-710, the trial court correctly expelled Millsap finding that his 
actions constituted material breaches of the Amended Operating Agreement. 
Millsap argues as the basis for his appeal that summaryjudgment in favor of CCD was 
inappropriate because there are issues of facts precluding summaryjudgment in favor of 
CCD. Millsap asserts that he raised an issue of fact by submitting an affidavit dated July 2, 
2002, with his Motion to Reconsider nearly one month after the trial court held oral argument 
and issued its ruling in favor of CCD. Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states 
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that a party must provide specific evidence in order to create an issue of fact at summary 
judgment. A party cannot raise issues of fact through an affidavit submitted after a summary 
judgment ruling. Such is the case with Millsap's untimely affidavit. Moreover, even if the 
Court considers Millsap's affidavit, it fails to raise an issue of fact precluding summary 
judgment. The affidavit merely states that Newman and Stanley were aware that Millsap was 
signing checks drawn on the Trust Account. The affidavit does not state, nor could it, that 
Newman or Stanley were aware that Millsap was again misdirecting money for his personal 
use or that Millsap took steps to conceal his wrongful actions from his partners. In short, 
Millsap's tardy affidavit does not raise an issue of fact precluding summary judgment in 
favor of CCD. 
Millsap also argues that CCD cannot expel him because he voluntarily withdrew as 
a "member" by submitting his notice of retirement prior to the judicial determination that he 
should be expelled. Millsap's interpretation of the Act must fail because it guts a company's 
right to seek expulsion of a member whose actions have harmed the company and in the 
process extinguish the member's ability to enforce his or her rights against the non breaching 
members. The Act's careful statutory scheme makes clear that the puipose of an expulsion 
proceeding is to prevent a member who has materially breached an operating agreement from 
continuing to make demands upon the company. Millsap's rights, including the right to 
retire, were severed after he materially breached the Amended Operating Agreement by 
misdirecting funds for himself. This interpretation of the Act is also consistent with the trial 
court's ruling that Millsap lost his right to retire or enforce the terms of the Amended 
Operating Agreement by virtue of the common law first to breach rule. 
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Millsap further argues that CCD waived its right to expel him because Newman and 
Stanley signed the Amendment after learning of his first wrongdoing. Newman and Stanley 
agreed to reinstate Millsap rights if certain conditions were met. Millsap, however, lost the 
right to reinstatement when he breached his agreement contained in the Amendment to not 
withdraw monies from the Trust Account, by diverting funds for his personal use in violation 
of his obligations under the Amended Operating Agreement, and by intentionally misleading 
Newman and Stanley of his actions after signing the Amendment. Simply put, CCD could 
not have waived its right to seek Millsap's expulsion because Millsap's wrongful acts 
continued even after the Amendment was signed. 
Finally, Newman and Stanley's actions in seeking Millsap's expulsion were not taken 
in bad faith as alleged by Millsap. Millsap argues that CCD's expulsion claim is an overt 
move to acquire his financial interest in CCD. The fallacy in this argument is exposed by 
clear provisions of the Act that provide a member who is expelled retains the status of an 
assignee. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 48-2c-708, 1102. Newman and Stanley clearly have 
nothing to gain from expelling Millsap other than to prevent Millsap from making continued 
demands upon the company, including his desire to dissolve and liquidate the company. 
Moreover, there is simply no evidence supporting Millsap's claims that Newman and Stanley 
have acted in bad faith. 
VII. ARGUMENT. 
1. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT MILLSAP 
MATERIALLY BREACHED THE AMENDED OPERATING 
AGREEMENT AND THAT HIS WRONGFUL CONDUCT 
ADVERSELY AND MATERIALLY AFFECTED CCD. 
In granting CCD's cross-motion for summary judgment the trial court held that 
Millsap materially breached both the Amendment and Operating Agreement and that his 
wrongful conduct materially and adversely affected CCD. [R. 586-590, Findings of Facts 
Conclusions of Law.] Consequently, the trial court found pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 48-
2c-710 Millsap should be expelled as a member. [R. 589.] Specifically, the court found that 
Millsap's manipulations of the Trust Account for his personal use after the Amendment was 
signed constituted material breaches of the Amended Operating Agreement that materially 
and adversely affected CCD. [R. 589.] 
Millsap attempts to manufacture an issue of fact as to whether or not he breached the 
Amended Operating Agreement claiming that CCD's members knew he was signing checks 
drawn on the Tmst Account after the Amendment was signed and, thereby waived the right 
to claim Millsap breached the amended Operating Agreement. Based upon the undisputed 
evidence in the record, however, Millsap's argument must fail because he did not timely 
offer the evidence, and the evidence he offered for waiver does not show that Newman or 
Stanley knew of Millsap's wrongful use of funds on deposit in the Trust Account after the 
Amendment was signed. 
A. Millsap's Misuse and Misappropriation of Funds from the Trust 
Account After He Signed the Amendment Are Undisputed and 
Constitute Material Breaches of the Amended Operating 
Agreement and Materially and Adversely Affected CCD. 
CCD went to great lengths to set forth the factual basis of Millsap's repeated misuse 
of funds on deposit in the Trust Account. The facts of Millsap's continued misuse of funds 
on deposit in the account even after signing the Amendment were undisputed at summary 
judgment. [R. 248-249, 477-478, CCD's Statement of Undisputed Facts, and Millsap's 
Response.] Because Millsap failed to dispute CCD's statement of undisputed material facts 
prior to the trial court's hearing and ruling on the cross-motion for summary judgment, he 
cannot now attempt to manufacture a dispute, because CCD's unrebutted statement of facts 
are deemed to be admitted. Rule 56(e) provides in pertinent part as follows: 
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in 
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue of fact for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, 
if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
U. R. Civ. PRO. RULE 56(e) (emphasis added). See also Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 
P.2d 120, 124-25 (Utah 1994) (stating that party opposing motion for summary judgment 
supported by affidavit has affirmative duty to respond with affidavit or other evidence); D 
& L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420,421 (Utah 1989) (same). Consistently, numerous Utah 
cases elaborating on Rule 56(e) have held that where a party fails to establish material issues 
of fact through affidavit or otherwise, parties cannot later raise issues of fact not originally 
presented to the court. In Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son, for instance, this Court restated 
the rule by holding as follows: "[Defendant]... was thus obligated to do more than simply 
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rely upon the allegations contained in its pleadings. Not having done so, either by the filing 
of counter-affidavits or on appropriate cross-motion for summary judgment, the issue was 
not raised and cannot now be raised for the first time on appeal." 808P.2d 1061,1067 (Utah 
1991); see also Busch Corp. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 743 P.2d 1217, 1219 (Utah 
1987) (citation omitted) (stating trial court may properly conclude no genuine issues of fact 
exist unless face of nonmovant's affidavit affirmatively discloses existence of such issue). 
In the Amendment, the members agreed that Newman would loan Millsap funds in 
order to pay back the monies he misappropriated from the Trust Account. [R. 418, 
Amendment \ 3.] Millsap agreed in the Amendment to relinquish his rights under the 
Operating Agreement, including the right to retire, and to dissolve or wind up the business. 
[R. 419, Amendment \ B.] The Amendment provided that if Millsap repaid the monies, did 
not default on the repayment of the loan, and there were no additional amendments to the ' 
Amended Operating Agreement within one year, his rights under the Operating Agreement 
would be restored. [R. 419-420, Amendment \ C] Millsap also agreed to be removed as a 
manager of CCD and agreed that he had no authority to withdraw funds from CCD's general 
or escrow accounts. [R. 418-419, Amendment \ A.] Newman, Stanley and CCD expressly 
stated, however, that they did not "waive any claims they may have against Millsap, 
including claims under the Operating Agreement, at law or in equity. Millsap hereby 
acknowledges and agrees that Newman, Stanley and CCD have and are reserving any and 
all such claims." [R. 420, Amendment ^ E.] By the Amendment, therefore, CCD's members 
agreed to give Millsap a second chance. Even after being given a second chance, however, 
Millsap breached his commitments in the Amended Operating Agreement. 
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Millsap admits that he intentionally misdirected and misappropriated monies from two 
separate closings in April and September of 2000. [R. 248-249, CCD's Statement of 
Undisputed Facts at ffif 11 and 12; R. 478, Millsap's Response to CCD's Statement of 
Undisputed Facts at ffi[ 11 and 12; and Millsap Brief, at 15-16134(b)(iii).] Indeed, Millsap 
did not dispute the evidence submitted by CCD that proves without any doubt that Millsap 
not only misdirected Trust Account funds for his personal use after signing the Amendment, 
but that he intentionally mislead Newman and Stanley of his wrongful actions. Thus, in 
addition to breaching his agreed upon obligation to have no authority to withdraw funds from 
the Trust Account, these continued misrepresentations were new violations of the Operating 
Agreement and Utah law. 
This Court in Polyglycoat Corporation v. Holcomb, in the context of a rescinded 
contract, stated that a material breach was a "failure of performance which 'defeats the very 
object of the contract' or '[is] of such prime importance that the contract would not have 
been made if default in that particular had been contemplated' is a material failure." 591 
P.2d 449, 451 (1979) (citations omitted)1; see also Industrial Constr. v. State, 1978 Utah 
Lexis 1186 (Utah) (finding that failure to performance essential part of a contract was a 
material breach). Millsap's actions constituted new material breaches of the Amended 
Operating Agreement because they cut to the very heart of his contractual obligations. 
'While Polyglycoat deals with the question of a rescinded contract, the Court's 
discussion of a "material breach" is also useful in this context. Millsap misconstrues CCD's 
argument as one for rescission. CCD does not argue that the Amended Operating Agreement 
should b e r escinded, b ut r ather t hat M illsap lost h is r ights o f e nforcement t hrough h is 
wrongful acts in violation of that agreement. 
CCD is engaged in the title insurance and escrow business and is entrusted with 
significant sums of monies by third parties. Those parties expect their funds will be carefully 
and strictly accounted and cared for by the company. Clients expect the utmost integrity in 
dealing with their assets. To engender this trust Section 7(E)(vii) of the Operating 
Agreement expressly prohibited Millsap and CCD's other members from "us[ing] the name, 
credit or property of the Company for any purpose other than a proper Company purpose." 
[R. 328-329.] Likewise, Section 7(E)(viii) of the Operating Agreement forbade him and the 
other members from engaging in "any act detrimental to the Company business or which 
would make it impossible to carry on business." [R. 328-329, Exhibit 2 of Newman Aff d, 
which is a copy of the Operating Agreement, at fflj 7(E) (vii) and (viii).] And, after Millsap's 
misconduct was discovered, the Amendment expressly provided that he had "no authority to 
withdraw funds from CCD's general or escrow accounts." [R. 418-419, Amendment at ^ f A.] 
Each of these provisions constituted material terms of the Amended Operating Agreement 
and were undisputedly breached by Millsap. Thus, the trial court correctly found that there 
were no disputed issues of fact precluding summary judgment, and that Millsap materially 
breached the Amended Operating Agreement and that these material breaches materially and 
adversely affected CCD. [R. 589, Conclusions of Law.] 
B. Millsap's July 2,2002 Affidavit Should Not be Considered Because 
It is Untimely and Irrelevant. 
Millsap attempts to raise an issue of fact of whether he "materially" breached the 
Amended Operating Agreement that was not raised in opposition to CCD's cross-motion for 
summaryjudgment. The undisputed facts set forth above were properly before the trial court 
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and were more than sufficient to support its ruling that Millsap materially breached the 
Amended Operating Agreement and that such conduct materially and adversely affected 
CCD's business. Indeed, Millsap presented no facts that contradicted the trial court's finding 
of material breach. Millsap even concedes in his brief that the trial court found that "in its 
oral ruling the Court seemingly adopted the first breach rule in refusing to allow Mr. Millsap 
to enforce the Amendment to the Operating Agreement." [R. 527, Millsap Brief at 36, n. 20]. 
In his Motion to Reconsider, however, Millsap reasserted the same legal arguments 
that were previously rejected by the trial court, but then raised for the first time in an affidavit 
dated July 2, 2002, the issue that CCD's other members were aware that he was signing 
checks drawn on the Trust Account after the Amendment was signed. [R. 531 -532, Millsap's 
July 2,2002 Affidavit.] Millsap's affidavit, however, was submitted one month after the trial 
court ruled in CCD's favor. 
Pursuant to Rule 56(e) and clear Utah case law, CCD's statements of fact are deemed 
admitted. The time for Millsap to contest CCD's statement of facts was prior to the trial 
court's ruling on the pending summaryjudgment motions. Millsap cannot raise issues of fact 
through his tardy affidavit submitted one month after the trial court held the summary 
judgment hearing and issued its oral ruling. Millsap cannot rely upon the facts set forth in 
his July 2, 2002, affidavit (that was untimely filed) to create issues of fact that preclude 
summaryjudgment based upon the facts before the trial court when it ruled on the pending 
motions for summaryjudgment. This Court has held that "[w]e will not consider the facts 
on appeal when there is no record the trial judge had access to those facts when deciding the 
motion at issue." Govert Copier Painting v. Craig Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163, 170 (Utah 
is 
Ct. App. 1990) (citing Conder v. A.L. Williams and Assoc., 739 P.2d 634,636 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). Millsap did not timely file his affidavit in opposition to CCD's cross-motion for 
summary judgment, and therefore, it should not be considered on appeal. 
Moreover, Millsap's tardy affidavit is irrelevant and fails to raise any issue of fact as 
to his material breaches of the Amended Operating Agreement. In his affidavit dated July 2, 
2002, Millsap states both Newman and Stanley were aware that Millsap was signing checks 
drawn on the Trust Account. [R. 532, Millsap Aff d at ^ f 6.] This fact is irrelevant because 
his wrongful conduct was more than signing checks drawn on the Trust Account, it included 
manipulating Trust Fund accounts and monies for his personal use. Even if CCD's other 
members knew he was signing checks drawn on the Trust Account, they did not know, nor 
was there any evidence offered by Millsap that they did know, that he continued to use the 
Trust Account for personal business in violation of the Amended Operating Agreement. 
Indeed, Millsap does not contest that he misused the Trust Account for his personal use after 
signing the Amendment, nor does he contest that he actually misappropriated a check in the 
amount of $70,000 that should have been paid to Dixon. [R. 248-249, CCD Statement of 
Undisputed Facts; R. 478, Millsap's Response at ^ | 12.] Millsap also does not state Newman 
or Stanley knew Millsap was engaging in wrongful conduct at the time it occurred. [R. 531 -
532, Millsap Aff d.] 
Moreover, whether or not the other members of CCD were aware that Millsap was 
signing Trust Account checks does not alter the fact that Millsap continued to breach the 
Amended Operating Agreement, even after having been given a second chance. The fact that 
Newman and Stanley agreed to reinstate Millsap's rights under the Operating Agreement if 
Millsap fulfilled certain conditions was premised upon the fact that Millsap would cease his 
misuse and misappropriation of Trust Account funds. Thus, based upon the undisputed facts 
before it on cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court correctly found that there 
was no issue of fact that Millsap materially breached either the Amendment or Operating 
Agreement. 
Likewise, this Court should disregard Millsap's attempts to create issues of fact 
through his tardy affidavit, and consider his appeal based upon the undisputed facts set forth 
in support of CCD's cross-motion for summary judgment. 
C. CCD Did Not Waive its Right to Seek Judicial Expulsion of Millsap for 
Millsap's Continued Defalcations after the Amendment Was Signed. 
Millsap argues that CCD waived its right to expel him by signing the Amendment that 
allegedly restored his rights under the Operating Agreement if the Newman Loan was timely 
repaid. Millsap admits that he materially breached the Operating Agreement by wrongfully 
taking hundreds of thousands of dollars from the Trust Account. Millsap submits, however, 
that because he fulfilled three conditions set forth in the Amendment, his rights under the 
Operating Agreement were restored - including the right to retire. Millsap's argument 
ignores the undisputed evidence in this case that supports the trial court's finding that Millsap 
materially breached the Amended Operating Agreement even after allegedly "coming clean." 
Millsap's argument fails for two reasons: (1) undisputed facts show that Millsap materially 
breached the Amended Operating Agreement through his continued wrongful use of Trust 
Account funds as late as October 2000; and (2) there are no facts that would support a 
finding that CCD intentionally waived its statutory right to seek Millsap's expulsion. 
Utah law is clear on the elements needed to find waiver: "A waiver is the intentional 
relinquishment of a known right There must be an existing right, benefit or advantage, 
a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it." Geisdorfv. Doughty, 972 P.2d 
67, 72 (Utah 1998) {quoting Soter's Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 857 P.2d 935, 
942 (Utah 1993) (other citation omitted)). "An intent to waive must be shown by action or 
conduct which is unequivocal and which is inconsistent with any other intent." Webb v. 
R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 804 P.2d 547, 552 (Utah Ct App. 1991) (finding that there was no 
competent evidence to support argument that plaintiff had "an unequivocal intent . . . to 
waive his contractual rights.") (citing Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988)). Similarly, there is no competent evidence to support a finding that CCD intentionally 
waived its statutory right to seek Millsap's expulsion. 
First, CCD's non-breaching members gave Millsap a second chance/and he defiled *' 
their trust not once but twice. CCD's statement of facts explain in great detail how Millsap 
continued to misappropriate monies in property closings even as late as October 2000. [R. 
243-249.] A s p reviously s et forth, i n A pril 2 000, M illsap i mproperly f unneled m oney 
through a closed file number to his company Gren Development. [R. 311-312, Newman 
Aff d at U 18.] Then in September and October 2000, Millsap misappropriated an additional 
$70,000 from a real estate closing that was paid to his company Gren Development instead 
of paying off the Dixon Trust Deed. [R. 312-313, Newman Aff d at ^  19.] Thus, CCD could 
not have waived its right to seek expulsion by signing the Amendment, because Millsap's 
wrongful acts occurred after the Amendment was signed. Nothing in the Amendment states 
CCD was waiving any rights to any claims against Millsap. To the contrary, Newman, 
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Stanley, and CCD expressly reserved all claims which Millsap expressly acknowledged. [R. 
420, Amendment at If E.] 
CCD does not argue that its members never agreed to reinstatement of Millsap's right 
to retire under the Operating Agreement. Clearly, the Amendment contemplated that if 
Millsap met certain obligations his rights would be restored. [R. 419-420, Amendment at 
U C] On the other hand, nowhere in the Amendment does it state that Newman, Stanley or 
CCD would not seek to enforce any rights they have to expel or otherwise prohibit Millsap 
from enforcing any rights he may have under the Amended Operating Agreement if he 
breached the agreement after the Amendment was signed. The Amendment is not a separate 
contract. Rather, as its name reflects, it was merely an amendment to the Operating 
Agreement. Thus, Millsap continued to owe the same duties to CCD and its other members 
that he owed to them prior to when the Amendment was signed. As set forth above, Millsap 
breached the Amended Operating Agreement by continuing to withdraw funds from the Trust 
Account for his personal use in violation of his agreement and fiduciary duties. A member 
may be expelled pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-710(3)(b) if the member has "willfully 
or persistently committed a material breach of the articles of incorporation or operating 
agreement or of a duty owed to the company or to the other members under Section 48-2c-
807 [concerning duties of managers and members] The fact that Millsap's wrongful use 
of Trust Account monies from CCD continued after the Amendment was signed is not in 
dispute. 
Second, even if this Court were to find that CCD waived its right to seek expulsion 
for Millsap's initial misdeeds that occurred prior to the signing of the Amendment, there is 
no competent evidence to support a finding that CCD intentionally waived its right to expel 
Millsap for his continued breaches of the Operating Agreement after signing the 
Amendment. Immediately upon learning of these new wrongful acts in October 2000, CCD 
quickly terminated Millsap's employment. [R. 313, Newman Aff d at |^ 20.] Over the next 
several months, CCD cooperated in the investigation with the Utah Insurance Department. 
In May 2001, Millsap's license as an escrow agent was revoked. [R. 314, Newman Aff d at 
K 21.] In March 2002, Millsap plead guilty to felony charges related to his misdeeds. [R. 
263-271, Statement of Defendant.] Prior to July 2001, Millsap did not seek to enforce any 
of the terms of the Operating Agreement against CCD. 
Then on July 6, 2001, Millsap, through his counsel, sent CCD a letter demanding 
financial information related to the company. [R. 314, Newman Affd; R. 466-467, 
Exhibit 43.] On September 7,2001, Millsap requested additional financial information that 
could be used to appraise his interest in CCD. [R. 314, Newman Affd; R. 469, Exhibit 44.] 
CCD gave Millsap the information it was required to give him. After negotiations regarding 
Millsap's rights failed to provide resolution, CCD filed its Complaint seeking Millsap 
expulsion on September 27, 2001. Moreover, Millsap did not offer any evidence to the trial 
court that CCD's other members were aware that he was wrongfully manipulating the Tmst 
Account in connection with the Gren Account and the Tippetts Closing. Consequently, his 
claim that CCD waived the right to enforce the Amendment's prohibition against him signing 
checks drawn on the Trust Account is unfounded inasmuch as waiver requires a knowing and 
intentional relinquishment of a known right. See Webb, 804 P.2d at 552. Instead, the record 
shows that immediately after Newman and Stanley discovered these new breaches, Millsap's 
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employment with CCD was terminated. There is simply no competent evidence to support 
a finding that CCD intentionally waived its rights to seek Millsap's expulsion. Therefore, 
this Court should reject Millsap's argument that CCD has waived its right to expel him from 
the company as a member. 
2. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE UTAH 
REVISED LIMITED LIABILITY ACT WHEN IT EXPELLED 
MILLSAP AS A MEMBER OF CCD. 
The trial court correctly interpreted the Act's expulsion provision codified at Utah 
Code Ann. § 48-2c-710 when it judicially expelled Millsap as a member of CCD. Millsap 
argues that the trial court misinterpreted the expulsion statute because he argues his alleged 
voluntarily retirement immediately ended his membership in CCD. He argues, therefore, that 
because the statutory expulsion scheme set forth in the Act applies only to "members", he 
could not be expelled because his membership ceased at the moment he gave notice of his 
retirement. Millsap's argument focuses on a hyper-technical interpretation of the word 
"member" and fails to consider the entire context and obvious purpose of the expulsion 
provision in the Act. This Court should uphold the trial court's finding that under the facts 
of this case the legislature intended to provide a company the right to expel a member. 
A, Fundamental Principles of Statutory Interpretation Require That 
CCD Have the Ability to Expel Millsap under These Facts, 
Under the facts of this case the Act should be interpreted to grant CCD the right to 
expel Millsap as a member to preclude him from participating in the company and attempting 
to dissolve it. "One of the cardinal principles of statutory construction is that the courts will 
look to the reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the entire context and 
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subject matter of the statute dealing with the subject." Mountain States Tel & Tel Co. v. 
Payne, 782 P.2d 464,466 (Utah 1989) (citation omitted). "When doubt or uncertainty exists 
as to the meaning or application of an act's provisions, an analysis of the act in its entirety 
should be undertaken and its provisions harmonized in accordance with the legislative intent 
and purpose." See Craftsman Builder's Supply v. Butler Mfg., 91A P.2d 1194, 1202 (Utah 
1999). While statutes must be interpreted according to their plain language, as cited by 
Millsap, hyper-technical readings that result in "unreasonable confused, inoperable, or blatant 
contradiction of the express purpose of the statute" are rejected by Utah courts. O'Keefe v. 
Utah State Ret. Bd., 956 P.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998) {quoting Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing 
D/v., 814 P.2d 581, 590 (Utah 1991)). As the Utah Supreme Court expressed in In re 
Marriage of Gonzalez, "[EJmphasis of only certain words in the statute ignores a 
fundamental principle of statutory construction, that 'terms of a statute are to be interpreted 
as a comprehensive whole and not in a piecemeal fashion.'" 1 P.3d 1074, 1079 (Utah 2000) 
quoting Morton Int'l Inc. v. Auditing Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 591 
(Utah 1991); see also CPNat'l Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 638 P.2d 519,523 (Utah 1981) 
(holding that statutes are interpreted in light of their association with surrounding words and 
phrases). 
CCD and Millsap are apparently in agreement that Millsap is no longer a member of 
CCD. Millsap takes the position that he is no longer a member by virtue of his alleged 
retirement, and CCD contends he is no longer a member by virtue of the trial court's 
expulsion order finding that he materially breached the Amended Operating Agreement. 
CCD and Millsap, however, differ on what rights Millsap had prior to the judicial 
determination expelling him from CCD. Millsap, even though he admits he is no longer a 
member, wishes to enforce the terms of the Operating Agreement that force CCD's 
remaining members into a Hobson's choice - either pay Millsap cash for his interest in CCD 
and thereby cripple the business or be forced to dissolve and liquidate the company. Millsap 
is thus attempting to leverage his wrongful use of Trust Account funds to enable him to lay 
his hands on CCD's assets by dissolving it, or alternatively forcing its remaining members 
to purchase his interest.2 
Even though Millsap argues that he is no longer a member of CCD, he hopes to 
enforce the terms of the Operating Agreement against CCD. Thus, Millsap argues that under 
the Act he has the right to retire and force dissolution regardless of his misdeeds, while the 
trial court found that the legislature intended to cut off any rights of a member who materially 
breaches an operating agreement through an expulsion proceeding. 
Millsap's reading of the Act must fail because the intent of the legislature is clear 
when the entire statutory scheme is analyzed. The stated purpose of the expulsion provision 
is to prevent members who engage in wrongful acts from participating in the affairs of the 
business. Section 48-2c-708 recognizes that a member ceases to be such in several ways, 
including by death, incapacity, assignment, expulsion or voluntarily withdrawal. Of these, 
expulsion is the only means by which a limited liability company may choose to terminate 
2In this case, Millsap seeks to enforce his alleged rights as a retiree under the 
Operating Agreement. Millsap has caused significant damage to CCD, wrongfully misused 
hundreds of thousands of dollars, and plead guilty to his crimes. Under such circumstances, 
the legislature could not have intended to allow him to force the other members of CCD to 
buy his interest or force a liquidation of the company. [R. 589, Conclusions of Law.] 
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a member's interest for misdeeds. While membership status also terminates for incapacity 
or withdrawal, for example, the member or his or her representative continues to have the 
rights to enforce the operating agreement. The difference between expulsion and the other 
means for terminating membership is that the company can force expulsion to protect itself 
against a member who has proven to be untrustworthy or harmful to the business. 
The expulsion provision contained in the Act provides as follows: 
A member of a company may be expelled: 
(3) on application by the company or another member, by judicial 
determination that the member: 
(a) engaged in wrongful conduct that adversely and materially 
affected the company's business; [or] 
(b) has willfully or persistently committed a material breach of 
the articles of organization or operating agreement or of a duty 
owed to the company or to the other members under Section 48 : 
2c-807 [concerning duties of managers and members] . . . . 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-710. Thus, a company may seek to expel a member for conduct 
that materially or adversely affects the company's business or for material breaches of the 
operating agreement. The provision provides a means by which a company can eliminate a 
member's right to participate and exercise rights under an operating agreement. 
Nowhere in the statutory framework does it provide when the expulsion becomes 
effective. The language merely requires an application for expulsion. Strong policy 
considerations support a finding that a member loses his ability to enforce his rights as a 
member as soon as those acts occur, because if he or she is acting wrongfully, they should 
not be allowed to continue to run the company and have their acts adversely impact the 
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innocent members.3 [Transcript of June 2,2002 Summary Judgment Hearing ("Tr.") at 28.] 
Finding that the date of expulsion should be the date the complaint was filed or the date of 
the order of expulsion would only leave innocent members subject to the member acting 
wrongfully, to the vagaries of the timing of the filing of the complaint or the timing of when 
a decision has been made by the trial court.4 
Contrary to Millsap's claim that his expulsion is an attempt to secure his "share of the 
company for the personal gain of the other members," once a member is expelled, the 
member only possess the rights of an assignee, which terminates all rights the member may 
have as a member or manager. [Millsap Brief at 28.] "A person who is a member of a 
company ceases to be a member of the company and the person or the person's successor in 
interest attains the status of an assignee as set forth in Section 48-2c-l 102 . . . . " See UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 48-2c-708. Consistently, UTAH CODE ANN.§ 48-2c-l 102 defines the rights of 
an assignee as follows: 
An assignment of an interest in a company does not entitle the assignee to 
participate in the management and affairs of the company or to vote or to 
The trial court found as follows: "Counsel, under the facts of this case, and this is my 
finding, that this is not necessarily fact intensive. I find that Mr. Millsap's resignation is a 
nullity under the facts of this case because of the intentional misuse of the trust account. I 
cannot imagine that the legislature contemplated under this fact scenario that someone could 
retain their membership rights under any circumstances. That's really what my reasoning is. 
And it has nothing to do with other than the existence of the statute, the creation of the statute 
and where it is. And what I see a very strong public policy argued it that would basically 
strip Mr. Millsap of rights that he would otherwise have if he had not gotten himself in such 
a terrible circumstance. That's my reasoning." [Tr. 28.] 
4Millsap argues that under CCD's interpretation of the Act, that a member could be 
expelled for conduct that occurred 25 years previously. This is not so. A statute of 
limitations would clearly bar any such stale claims. 
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become a member or to exercise any rights of a member or manager. An 
assignment only entitles the assignee to receive, to the extent assigned, any 
share of profits and losses and distributions to which the assignor would be 
entitled. 
(emphasis added). Moreover, Section 48-2c-l 101 expressly provides that "An assignment 
of an interest in a company does not of itself dissolve the company." Consequently, the 
purpose of the expulsion provision of the Act is to enable the company and other members 
who did not participate in the wrongful conduct to continue in business, as originally 
contemplated when the business began, unfettered by the participation of the member who 
engaged in wrongful conduct. This policy is in effect an expression of the first to breach rule 
discussed below, where a breaching party cannot enforce the terms of an agreement to which 
he or she is a party. Indeed, a basis for expulsion is the offending member's willful "material 
breach of the . . . operating agreement " UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-710(3)(b). 
The facts of Millsap's misappropriation of over $625,000 from the CCD Trust 
Account and his continued material breaches of the Amended Operating Agreement are not 
disputed in this case. Specifically, the following facts are not in dispute: Millsap 
misappropriated over 5625,000 from the Trust Account for the development of the Pheasant 
Meadow Property in which he held an ownership interest; after signing the Amendment, he 
again misused and misappropriated monies from the Trust Account for his personal gain; 
thereafter his employment with CCD was terminated; his escrow license was revoked by the 
Department of Insurance; and he was charged and plead guilty to five felony counts of 
unlawful dealing of property by a fiduciary. [R. 476,478-479, Response to CCD's Statement 
of Undisputed Facts at ffl[ 4, 11, 12, and 15.] Millsap's wrongdoing undisputably justifies 
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expulsion under the Act. As long as a court finds facts meeting the criteria of wrongdoing 
set forth therein, expulsion is appropriate regardless of any attempt by Millsap to retire after 
his misdeeds were discovered. 
Millsap argues, however, that his voluntarily retirement trumps a company's right to 
seek expulsion because only a "member" can be expelled. He claims that when he submitted 
his notice of retirement, he immediately ceased to be a member, and therefore, he cannot be 
expelled since he is no longer a member. The Act defines a "member" as a "person with an 
ownership interest in a company and with the rights and obligations specified under this 
chapter." UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-102(14) (emphasis added). Under this definition and 
the statutory framework set forth above, Millsap's membership in CCD ceased when he lost 
his rights by misappropriating monies from the Trust Account in violation of the Amended 
Operating Agreement. Thus, while Millsap was not officially expelled as a member until the 
judicial determination was made by the trial court, he no longer possessed the rights of a 
"member" after his breaches of the Amended Operating Agreement. 
Millsap analogizes his situation vis a 'vis CCD to a tenant who has already vacated the 
premises. How can a tenant who no longer lives in an apartment be evicted, he quires? That, 
however, is not the case here. A landlord could not evict a tenant who has already vacated 
the premises because the eviction is moot. The tenant no longer occupies the premises. 
There is nothing moot, however, about Millsap's desire to make continued demands on CCD. 
By analogy, Millsap claims that even though he does not live in the apartment, he still has 
the keys to the door and he can keep others from occupying the premises. Indeed, Millsap 
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wants to destroy the entire premises by causing a dissolution of CCD. As explained, CCD 
has the statutory right to stop Millsap's demands on the company by seeking his expulsion. 
Indeed, the expulsion provision is not limited to ending Millsap's membership in CCD 
- it is also aimed at preventing him from exercising his rights under the Amended Operating 
Agreement. If a member could simply withdraw once his wrongdoing is discovered, he 
could force the company into dissolution through his continued exercise of rights under the 
operating agreement. Withdrawal under the statute is predicated on "happening of events 
specified in and in accordance with the articles of organization or operating agreement." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-709. The legislature's clear purpose in providing a means of 
expulsion was to terminate a member's rights under an operating agreement, relegating them 
to the status of an assignee. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1102. Thus, while Millsap 
maintains his interest in CCD as an assignee with his proportionate ownership interest in the 
company, he loses the right to participate in the management of the company or to enforce 
his rights under the Amended Operating Agreement as a result of his wrongful conduct. 
If Millsap's argument is accepted, any member whose acts constitute grounds for 
expulsion under the Act could avoid that remedy by voluntarily withdrawing to escape being 
relegated to the status of an assignee. Millsap's reading of the statute would have this Court 
insert a condition that a member may be expelled for wrongful conduct, unless that member 
withdraws from the company first. The explicit purpose of the expulsion statute allows a 
company that has been injured by a member to cut off all rights that member has to make 
demands upon the company that would impair the nonoffending members' ability to continue 
to conduct business. Interpreting the Act in such a way that allows a member's alleged 
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voluntary retirement to trump a company's right to seek expulsion guts Section 48-2c-710, 
making the right to expel a member meaningless. 
Millsap contends that the purpose of the expulsion statute "is to provide a mechanism 
of evicting a member who has engaged in conduct which has and continues to disrupt and 
harm the company, and where this member refuses to disassociate." [Millsap Brief at 22] 
Millsap, however, is not disassociating himself from any of the rights under the Amended 
Operating Agreement. To the contrary, he continues to seek enforcement of those rights, 
including the right to retire and dissolve the company or force the remaining members to buy 
his interest. M illsap c annot b e t rusted a s fully e xplained a bove. N ow t hat h e c annot 
participate because he is untrustworthy, he wants the company dissolved. Expulsion will 
prevent him from meddling in the business affairs of the company, by preventing him from 
causing it to cease to exist. 
Fundamental rules of statutory construction require that courts interpret statutes with 
the "reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the entire context and subject 
matter of the statute dealing with the subject." Mountain States Tel & Tel. Co., 782 P.2d at 
466. When viewed in the entire context of the Act, the statutory framework simply does not 
support the conclusion advocated by Millsap. The legislature could not have intended 
Millsap's alleged retirement to preempt CCD's right to seek his expulsion for material 
breaches of the Operating Agreement and Amendment. This Court, therefore, should uphold 
the trial court's ruling expelling Millsap as a member of CCD. 
10 
B. The Timing of MiHsap's Alleged Retirement and the Filing of a 
Complaint for Expulsion Are Irrelevant 
Millsap quibbles with the trial court's oral statement during the hearing on the 
summary judgment motions that his expulsion was effective at the moment Millsap 
committed his wrongful acts.5 The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered by the 
Court, which are determinative for purposes of this appeal, provide that under the facts of 
this case, where Millsap submitted his notice of retirement after the Complaint seeking his 
expulsion was filed, CCD was entitled to an order expelling Millsap as a member. 
Millsap's argument that his retirement was effective the moment he sent the letter of 
retirement fails to consider the rights conveyed by the Utah legislature to CCD by the 
expulsion provision. Millsap submits that the trial court's ruling encourages "races to the 
courthouse" because the ruling concentrated on the timing of the filing of the Complaint. 
The trial court's ruling, however, found only under the facts of this case that CCD was 
entitled to an order expelling Millsap.6 [Tr. 28-30, R. 589.] 
Even if Millsap would have sent his notice of retirement prior to the filing of CCD's 
Complaint, CCD's right to seek expulsion would not have been preempted. Indeed, the 
5Even though what the Court stated was that his expulsion would be effective at the 
moment he committed his wrongful acts, what the Court probably intended, and what is 
consistent with the Act's construction, is that Millsap lost his right to enforce the terms of 
the Operating Agreement and Amendment immediately upon commission of his wrongful 
acts. [Tr. at 30.] 
°This Court can sustain the trial court's ruling granting summary judgment in favor 
of CCD "on any legal ground or theory apparent from the record, even though such ground 
or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action . . . 
." Bailey v. Bayles, 52 P.3d 1158, 1161 (Utah 2002). 
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legislative scheme set forth above provides a clear right to seek expulsion whenever a 
member's acts meet the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-710. A company must 
have a reasonable opportunity to seek expulsion where a member is wrongfully seeking to 
enforce rights under the operating agreement. Creating a race to the courthouse or the 
mailbox is surely not what the legislature intended. Rather, a reasonable interpretation of the 
statutory framework requires that where a member commits material breaches of an operating 
agreement that justify his expulsion, a company should be entitled to seek his expulsion to 
prevent the exercise of those rights.7 S imilarly, until a judicial determination is made 
pursuant to 48-2c-710, a member should be prevented from withdrawing or forcing an 
immediate liquidation of the company. Otherwise, a member could simply preempt a 
company's right to seek expulsion by voluntarily withdrawing at any point after the wrongful 
acts were committed. Thus, while the trial court's ruling concentrated on the facts of this 
case, the underlying principal is consistent with the entire legislative scheme set forth in the 
Act - a company has the right to seek a judicial determination of expulsion without the threat 
that the member may voluntarily withdraw in the meantime, rendering its right meaningless. 
[Tr. 28-30.] 
7After Millsap's additional breaches of the Amended Operating Agreement were 
discovered in September and October of 2000, CCD immediately terminated Millsap's 
employment with CCD. [R. 313, Newman Aff d at ^  20.] After his termination, Millsap did 
not attempt to assert any rights against CCD until the summer of 2001, when he demanded 
financial information from CCD. CCD then moved to expel Millsap by filing the Complaint 
on September 27, 2001. [R. 314, Newman Aff d at ffi| 23-24.] 
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C. The Operating Agreement's Prohibition Against Expulsion is 
Trumped by the Act's Expulsion Provision. 
Millsap argues that the trial court's ruling guts the Act's directive that the agreement 
of the parties should control. M illsap submits that when consideration is given to the 
Amended Operating Agreement's provision prohibiting a member's expulsion and the 
Amendment that allegedly reinstates Millsap's rights thereunder, he cannot be expelled. 
Millsap's argument fails because the Act's expulsion provision admittedly overrides the 
Amended Operating Agreement's prohibition on expulsion, and Millsap lost the right to 
enforce the Amended Operating Agreement through his material breaches. 
While it is true that the Act provides guidance that it should be interpreted to provide 
for "maximum effect to the principal of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of 
operating agreements of companies", UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2c-1901; Section § 48-2c-502 
of the Utah Code Ann. provides that "Where the provisions of an operating agreement 
conflict with the provisions of this chapter, the provisions of this chapter shall control." 
Additionally, Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c- 120(f) expressly states that a company's articles of 
organization or operating agreement may not "vary the right to expel a member based on any 
event specified in Subsection 48-2c-710(3)." The Act was significantly amended in 2001. 
Some of the additions to the Act included the expulsion provision codified at Utah Code 
Ann. § 48-2c-710 and the prohibition against varying a company's right to seek expulsion 
set forth in Subsection 48-2c- 120(f). Indeed the Amended Operating Agreement's 
prohibition against expulsion only applies to its members, not the company. Clearly, if the 
provision of the Amended Operating Agreement prohibits CCD itself from expelling any of 
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its members that provision conflicts with the 2001 amendments to the Act providing the right 
of expulsion. Millsap even admits that "If there had been an ongoing problem with CCD 
which justified the use of the expulsion statute, then unquestionably, Utah Code Ann. § 48-
2c-120(f) would trump the CCD Operating Agreement insofar as it provided that there 
should be no expulsion of a member." [Millsap Brief at p. 25] Thus, Section 48-2c-710 
controls and the prohibition in the Amended Operating Agreement against expulsion relied 
upon by Millsap is void. 
Moreover, Millsap's argument that this Court should give effect to the parties 
contractual agreement in the Amendment to reinstate Millsap's rights under the Operating 
Agreement presumes that there were no material breaches of the Amended Operating 
Agreement. The undisputed evidence supporting the trial court's finding of material 
breaches of the agreement by Millsap is set forth in detail in several places in this 
memorandum, and is not restated here again. Because Millsap's reliance under the "right to 
contract" is based upon a faulty factual premise - i.e., there are no facts justifying expulsion 
- his argument must be rejected. 
3- THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE FIRST TO 
BREACH DOCTRINE BY FINDING THAT MILLSAP COULD NOT 
RETIRE BECAUSE OF HIS MATERIAL BREACHES OF THE 
AMENDMENT AND OPERATING AGREEMENT. 
As an alterative ground for summary judgment, the trial court also ruled that Millsap 
had no right to enforce the terms of the Amended Operating Agreement against CCD because 
of his material breaches of both agreements. [R. 589, Conclusions of Law at ^ J1.] While the 
first to breach rule is based upon a longstanding common law doctrine, it is entirely 
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consistent with the Act's statutory scheme set forth above that prevents a member from 
exercising rights under an operating agreement after materially breaching that agreement. 
Millsap's abuse of the Trust Account clearly constitutes a material breach of the prohibition 
against using company property for personal reasons, engaging in acts detrimental to CCD 
and violates the express prohibition contained in the Amendment that he had no authority to 
withdraw funds from the Trust Account. 
This Court has long recognized that 
As a rule, a party first guilty of a substantial or material breach of 
contract cannot complain if the other party thereafter refuses to 
perform. He can neither insist on performance by the other party 
nor maintain an action against the other party for a subsequent 
failure to perform. . . . It has also been said that where a contract is 
not performed, the party who is guilty of the first breach is generally the 
one upon whom rests all the liability for the nonperformance. 
Jackson v. Rich, 499 P.2d 279, 280-281 (Utah 1972) (emphasis added); quoting 17 ' 
Am.Jur.2d, Contracts § 365; see also YoungElec. Sign Co. v. Vetas, 564 P.2d 758,759 (Utah 
1977) (reciting rule that one who materially breaches a contract cannot enforce performance 
against another); Fisher v. Taylor, 572 P.2d 393, 395 (Utah 1972) (finding that party who 
first breached contract cannot complain of later breach by the other party); see also Industrial 
Constr. v. State, 1978 Utah Lexis 1186 (Utah) (finding that failure to performance essential 
part of a contract was a material breach). 
Here, Millsap materially breached the Amended Operating Agreement because his 
breach of trust cuts to the very heart of his obligations to CCD. Millsap was entrusted with 
running the affairs of CCD. When his first misappropriations of Trust Account funds were 
discovered, Newman and Stanley agreed to give Millsap a second chance by signing the 
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Amendment. By continuing to misuse Trust Account funds after signing the Amendment, 
however, Millsap lost his right to enforce the terms of that agreement against CCD and he 
is barred from asserting any rights thereunder. Moreover, after the Amendment was signed 
Millsap's escrow license was revoked and he plead guilty to five felony counts of misusing 
funds deposited into the Trust Account. Therefore, Millsap cannot rely on the Amendment 
as a basis that his right to retire was reinstated, or that CCD waived the right to expel him as 
a member of CCD. Inasmuch as he cannot enforce the Amendment, his misconduct that 
occurred prior to the time the Amendment was signed, is an independent b asis for his 
expulsion. Pursuant to the first to breach doctrine and consistent with the statutory 
framework, Millsap lost his right to enforce the terms of the Amended Operating Agreement 
against CCD when he materially breached that agreement by misappropriating Trust Account 
funds both before and after signing the Amendment. 
4. MILLSAP'S ALLEGATIONS OF BAD FAITH BY CCD ARE NOT 
SUPPORTED BY ANY EVIDENCE OR HIS CONTINUED 
OWNERSHIP AS AN ASSIGNEE. 
Millsap argues the trial court erred in granting CCD's motion for summaryjudgment 
because CCD's motive for expelling him was in bad faith. Millsap submits that CCD's 
expulsion claim is essentially a grab for his money, intended to divest him of his interest in 
CCD for the benefit of its other members. [Millsap Brief at 26-28.] Additionally, Millsap 
submits that Newman and Stanley acted in bad faith when they allegedly presented him with 
a choice of walking away from CCD or being turned over to the authorities. [Millsap Brief 
at 10, Tfll 14-16.] Millsap's argument that CCD acted in bad faith is unfounded and there is 
no evidence to support his spurious allegation. 
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First, there is no evidence to support Millsap's claim of bad faith. Millsap refers to 
the minutes of a meeting held on October 25,2000, wherein Millsap's wrongful conduct was 
discussed. [R. 491, which is a copy of the minutes.] Millsap argues that these minutes prove 
that Newman and Stanley were only interested in obtaining Millsap's ownership interest in 
CCD. Nothing in these minutes, however, supports such an outlandish conclusion. Rather, 
the minutes simply reflect that the parties discussed a "quiet parting of the ways", a potential 
non compete agreement, an indemnification agreement, and Millsap's separation from CCD. 
Thus, there is absolutely no evidence that could support a finding that Newman and Stanley 
have exercised any of their rights in bad faith. [R. 491.] 
Second, Millsap misinterprets the effect of his expulsion. As explained above, 
Section § 48-2c-708 provides an expelled member receives the rights of an assignee. Section 
§ 48-2c-l 102 states an assignee has no authority to participate in the management of the 
business, but he continues to "any share of the profits and losses and distributions to which 
the assignor would be entitled." Here, Millsap's expulsion does not provide any financial 
benefit to the other members of CCD, because Millsap continues to own his one third interest 
in CCD. The expulsion statute was created for just such a situation - to prohibit a member 
who engaged in wrongful conduct from participating in the company's business and 
exercising rights under an operating agreement. Upon expulsion, Millsap loses the right to 
participate in the business, having the rights only of an assignee. 
The case of Lawlis v. Kightlinger & Gray, relied upon by Millsap, is particularly 
instructive on this score. 562 N.E.2d 435 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). In Lawlis, a law partnership 
expelled a senior partner who had problems with alcoholism. Instead of immediately 
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expelling him, the law firm gave the partner a second chance. After the partner began to 
make additional demands on the partnership, the partners voted to expel him. The expelled 
partner sued claiming, inter alia, that he was expelled in bad faith. The Lawlis court rejected 
the partners' claim finding that "good faith" in such a situation is defined as "a state of mind 
indicating honest lawfulness of purpose: belief in one's legal title or grant: belief that one's 
conduct is not unconscionable . . . : absence of fraud, deceit, collusion, or gross negligence. 
. . . " Id. at 443. Thus, because the partners were simply exercising their rights to expel the 
partner, their actions could not be bad faith as a matter of law. Id. The court explained valid 
justifications for expulsion in a partnership as follows: 
[T]he prime generators of. . . lifeblood [of a partnership] are good will and a 
favorable reputation. . . . Any condition which has the potential to adversely 
affect the good will or favorable reputation of a law partnership is one which 
potentially involves the partnership's economic survival. Thus, if a partner's 
propensity toward alcohol has the potential to damage his firm's good will or 
reputation for astuteness in the practice of law, simple prudence dictates the 
exercise of corrective action, . . . since the survival of the partnership itself 
potentially is at stake. 
Id. at 442; see also Paula Dalley, Article: The Law of Partner Expulsions: Fiduciary Duty 
and Good Faith, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 181, 201 (1999) ("An expulsion right is exercised in 
good faith when it is done for a purpose within the contemplation of the parties, such as to 
protect partners from a partner who has become untrustworthy or to remove a partner who 
has made the cooperative operation of the business impossible. . . .") 
Similarly, in this case, CCD gave Millsap a second chance. After signing the 
Amendment, however, he continued to misuse the Trust Account for his own benefit, his 
escrow license was revoked by the Department of Insurance, additional undisclosed misdeeds 
AH 
came to light, and he plead guilty to five felonies related to his misdeeds. Moreover, CCD's 
business, much like a law firm, is based on goodwill, a favorable reputation, and the trust of 
its clients. Milisap's wrongful acts clearly threatened the good will and reputation of CCD. 
Like Lawlis, there are simply no facts that could support a finding that CCD was acting in 
bad faith outside of its legal rights to seek Milisap's expulsion. 
On the other hand, Milisap's notice of retirement is clearly an attempt to deliver the 
final blow to CCD and its other members. After all of his admitted wrongful acts, Millsap 
seeks t o force CCD to buy-out his interest, or in the alternative, to dissolve CCD and 
liquidate its assets. Milisap's fraudulent acts have harmed CCD's good will. It is undisputed 
that even after being given a second chance, Millsap failed to observe the terms of the 
Amended Operating Agreement. Given these undisputed facts, it is amazing that Millsap 
would claim CCD acted with bad faith by exercising its statutory rights under the Act to 
prevent his continued participation in CCD's business. Thus, Milisap's argument that CCD, 
Newman or Stanley have acted in bad faith should be rejected. 
5- IN ANY EVENT, DISPUTED ISSUES OF FACT PRECLUDE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF MILLSAP. 
Should this Court for any reason find that the trial court improperly granted summary 
judgment in favor of CCD, summaryjudgment cannot be granted in favor of Millsap because 
issues of fact remain as to whether or not he fraudulently induced Newman and Stanley to 
enter into the Amendment. As a separate and alternative ground for summaryjudgment, 
CCD argued that the Amendment was ineffective because Millsap had fraudulently induced 
the members of CCD to enter into the Amendment. Millsap concedes that his handwritten 
accounting improperly gives himself at least $11,000 in credits. [R. 477-478, Millsap's 
Responses to CCD's Statement of Undisputed Facts at ^ 8.] CCD argued that Millsap 
intentionally misrepresented that his accounting was an accurate reflection of the monies he 
had misappropriated and returned to the Trust Account. The trial court found, however, that 
there were disputed issues with regard to Millsap's intent. [R. 589, Conclusions of Law at 
1 5.] 
Additionally, if the Court finds that there are disputed issues of fact as to whether or 
not CCD waived any of its rights to expel Millsap, likewise, CCD is entitled to a factual 
determination of those issues by the trial court. Thus, in any event, this Court cannot grant 
summary judgment in favor of Millsap because there are disputed issues of fact that preclude 
summaryjudgment in Millsap's favor and CCD is entitled to a determination of these factual 
issues at trial. 
VIII. CONCLUSION, 
In conclusion the trial court's ruling should be upheld. Millsap materially breached 
the Amended Operating Agreement. Consequently, any prohibition against expulsion and 
right to retire are barred. Millsap materially breached the Amended Operating Agreement 
and his wrongful acts adversely and materially impacted CCD's business. Moreover, Millsap 
did not timely offer any evidence that CCD's members were aware he was signing checks 
and in any event he did not offer any evidence that they were aware that he was wrongfully 
misusing the Trust Account after the Amendment was signed. Millsap, therefore, was 
properly expelled as a member of CCD and the judgment entered by the trial court should be 
upheld. 
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BRIEF OF APPELLEE CCD, L. C. 
Tab A 
48-2c-120. Articles of organization and operating agree-
ment, 
(1) A company's articles of organization or operating agreement may not: 
(a) restrict a right to inspect and copy records under Section 48-2c-113; 
(b) reduce the duties of members or managers under Section 48-2c-807; 
(c) eliminate the obligation of good faith and fair dealing, except that 
the members by written agreement may determine the standards by 
which the performance of the obligation is to be measured, if the standards 
are not manifestly unreasonable; 
(d) vary any filing requirement under this chapter; 
(e) vary any requirement under this chapter that a particular action or 
provision be reflected in a writing; 
(f) vary the right to expel a member based on any event specified in 
Subsection 48-2c-710(3); 
(g) vary the remedies under Section 48-2c-1210 for judicial dissolution 
of a company; 
(h) except as allowed by Section 48-2c-1103 or any other provision of 
law, restrict rights of, or impose duties on, persons other than the 
members, their assignees and transferees, the managers, and the com-
pany, without the consent of those persons; or 
(i) eliminate or limit the personal liability of a manager to the company 
or its members for damages for any breach of duty in the capacity where 
a judgment or other final adjudication adverse to the manager establishes 
that the manager's acts or omissions were in bad faith or involved gross 
negligence or willful misconduct or that the manager personally gained a 
financial profit or other advantage to which the manager was not legally 
entitled. 
(2) The articles of organization and operating agreement may: 
(a) vary the requirement under Section 48-2c-1104 that, if all of the 
other members of the company other than the member proposing to 
dispose of the member's interest do not approve of the proposed transfer or 
assignment by unanimous written consent, the transferee of the member's 
interest shall have no right to participate in the management of the 
business or affairs of the company or to become a member; and 
(b) vary the requirement under Section 48-2c-703 that, after the filing 
of the original articles of organization, a person may be adioitted as an 
additional member only upon the written consent of all members. 
History: C. 1953, 48-2c-120, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 2001, ch. 260, § 
2001, ch. 260, § 27. 197 makes the act effective on July 1, 2001. 
48-2c-502. General rules for operating agreements, 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection 48-2c-120(l), or in the articles of 
organization, an operating agreement may modify the rules of any provision of 
this chapter that relates to: 
(a) the management of the company; 
(b) the business or purpose of the company; 
(c) the conduct of the company's affairs; or 
(d) the rights, duties, powers, and qualifications of, and relations 
between and among, the members, the managers, the members' assignees 
and transferees, and the company. 
(2) Where the provisions of an operating agreement conflict with the 
provisions of this chapter, the provisions of this chapter shall control. Where 
the provisions of an operating agreement conflict with the articles of organi-
zation, the articles of organization shall control except to the extent the articles 
of organization conflict with the provisions of this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 48-2c-502, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 2001, ch. 260, § 
2001, ch. 260, § 67. 197 makes the act effective on July 1, 2001. 
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(c) the member withdraws by voluntary act from the company as 
provided in Section 48-2c-709; 
(d) upon the assignment of the member's entire interest in the com-
pany; 
(e) the member is expelled as a member pursuant to Section 48-2c-710; 
or 
(f) unless otherwise provided in the operating agreement, or with the 
written consent of all other members: 
(i) at the time the member: 
(A) makes a general assignment for the benefit of creditors; 
(B) files a voluntary petition in bankruptcy; 
(C) becomes the subject of an order for relief in bankruptcy 
proceedings; 
(D) files a petition or answer seeking for the member any 
reorganization, arrangement, composition, readjustment, liqui-
dation, dissolution, or similar relief under any statute, law, or 
regulation; 
(E) files an answer or other pleading admitting or failing to 
contest the material allegations of a petition filed against the 
member in any proceeding of the nature described in Subsections 
(lXfXiXA) through (D); or 
(F) seeks, consents to, or acquiesces in the appointment of a 
trustee, receiver, or liquidator of the member or of all or any 
substantial part of the member's properties; 
(ii) 120 days after the commencement of any proceeding against the 
member seeking reorganization, arrangement, composition, readjust-
ment, liquidation, dissolution, or similar relief under any statute, law, 
or regulation, the proceeding has not been dismissed, or if within 90 
days after the appointment without his or her consent or acquiescence 
of a trustee, receiver, or liquidator of the member or of ail or any 
substantial part of the member's properties, the appointment is not 
vacated or stayed, or within 90 days after the expiration of any stay, 
the appointment is not vacated; 
(iii) in the case of a member that is another limited liability 
company, the filing of articles of dissolution or the equivalent for that 
company or the judicial dissolution of that company or the adminis-
trative dissolution of that company and the lapse of any period 
allowed for reinstatement; 
(iv) in the case of a member that is a corporation, the filing of 
articles of dissolution or the equivalent for the corporation or the 
administrative dissolution of the corporation and the lapse of any 
period allowed for reinstatement; or 
(v) in the case of a member that is a limited partnership, the 
dissolution and commencement of winding up of the limited partner-
ship. 
(2) The articles of organization or operating agreement may provide for 
other events the occurrence of which result in a person's ceasing to be a 
member of the company. 
48-2c-709. Withdrawal of a member. 
A member may withdraw from a company at the time or upon the happening 
of events specijfied in and in accordance with the articles of organization or 
operating agreement. If the articles of organization or operating agreement do 
not specify the time or the events upon the happening of which a member may 
withdraw, a member may not withdraw prior to the dissolution and completion 
of winding up of the company, without the written consent of all other members 
at the time. 
History: C. 1953, 4&-2c-709, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 2001, ch. 260, § 
2001, ch. 260, § 85. 197 makes the act effective on July 1, 2001. 
48-2c-710. Expulsion of a member. 
A member of a company may be expelled: 
(1) as provided in the company's operating agreement; 
(2) by unanimous vote of the other members if it is unlawful to carry on 
the company's business with the member; or 
(3) on application by the company or another member, by judicial 
determination that the member: 
(a) has engaged in wrongful conduct that adversely and materially 
affected the company's business; 
(b) has willfully or persistently committed a material breach of the 
articles of organization or operating agreement or of a duty owed to 
the company or to the other members under Section 48-2c-807; or 
(c) has engaged in conduct relating to the company's business 
which makes it not reasonably practicable to carry on the business 
with the member-
History: C. 1953,48-2c-710, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 2001, ch. 260, § 
2001, ch. 260, § 86. 197 makes the act effective on July 1, 2001. 
48-2c-1102. Rights of assignee* 
An assignment of an interest in a company does not entitle the assignee to 
participate in the management and affairs of the company or to vote or to 
become a member or to exercise any rights of a member or manager. An 
assignment only entitles the assignee to receive, to the extent assigned, any 
share of profits and losses and distributions to which the assignor would be 
entitled. 
History: C. 1953, 48-2c-1102, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2001, ch. 260, § 
L. 2001, ch. 260, § 111. 197 makes the act effective on July 1, 2001. 
48-2c-1901. Legislative intent — Freedom of contract. 
It is the intent of the Legislature that this chapter be interpreted so as to 
give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the 
enforceability of operating agreements of companies. 
r IJ!ftory: C* 1953> 48-2c-1901, enacted by Effective Dates. — Laws 2001, ch 260, § 
u
 2001, ch. 260, § 192. 197 makes the act effective on July 1, 2001 
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Rule 56, Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part 
thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits 
shall be filed and served in accordance with CJA 4-501. The judgment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with che affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy 
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall 
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial 
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other 
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action 
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed 
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and 
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such 
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified 
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached 
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supple-
mented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further 
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as 
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations 
or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a 
party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of the 
court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule are 
presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the amount 
of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to 
incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney 
may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
(Amended effective November 1, 1997.) 
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Gren Trust Deed. Funds disbursed to Gren Development pursuant to the Loan were drawn upon the 
Trust Account by check number 38732 ("First Gren Check"). Exhibit 27 is a copy of the First Gren 
Check. In connection with the Loan CCD issued a policy of title insurance, number 4809-A-40, 
insuring the validity of the Gren Trust Deed. On April 5, 2000, Mr. Millsap caused $60,000 to be 
deposited into the Trust Account under the Gren Account Number, the same number used in 
connection with the Loan. Attached as Exhibits 28 and 29 are copies of the deposit slip dated 
April 4, 2000 and the related cashier's check, number 61-138632094 in the amount of $60,000 
("Cashier's Check") respectively. The Cashier's Check bears Mr. Millsap's hand writing which 
states "not secured." On April 5, 2000 Mr. Millsap caused check number 39203 to be drawn upon 
the Trust Account made payable to Gren Development ("Second Gren Check"). Attached as Exhibit 
30 is a copy of Second Gren Check. The Second Gren Check is endorsed by Mr. Millsap. On April 
25, 2000, $45,000 was transferred into the Trust Account by wire transfer to be deposited into the 
Trust Account under the Gren Account Number, the number used in connection with the Loan. 
Exhibits 31 and 32 are copies of the deposit slip and the bank wire transfer documentation 
respectively. On April 25, Mr. Millsap caused check number 39619 to be drawn upon the Trust 
Account made payable to Gren Development ("Third Gren Check"). Attached as Exhibit 33 is a 
copy of Third Gren Check. The Third Gren Check is endorsed by Mr. Millsap. It is against CCD's 
policy to use the same account number for different transactions such as the forgoing. 
19. On September 29,2000, the sale of real estate ("Ford Property") by Shelly Reynolds-
Ford to Milton L. Tippetts was closed ("Tippetts Closing") at CCD's offices. Attached as Exhibit 
34 is a copy of the Settlement Statement ("Statement") related to the Tippetts Closing. Pat Dixon 
held a deed of trust ("Dixon Trust Deed") that encumbered the Ford Property. Exhibit 35 is a copy 
of Schedule A to the commitment of title insurance ("Commitment") CCD issued in connection with 
the Tippetts Closing that shows the existence of the Dixon Trust Deed. Line 504 of the Statement 
14 
shows that $81,281.91 was to be disbursed to Pat Dixon from the sales proceeds. Mr. Millsap 
caused check number 42600 in the amount of $81,271.91 ("First Check") to be prepared in 
connection with that closing. He signed the First Check. Attached as Exhibit 36 is a copy of the 
First Check. The First Check was sent to me to induce me to execute a reconveyance of the Dixon 
Trust Deed inasmuch as United Title Services of Utah, Inc., of which I am the owner, was the trustee 
of the Dixon Trust Deed. The First Check was sent to me by facsimile on October 3,2000. At the 
same time the First Check was sent to me a copy of the First Check marked void was also sent to me 
by facsimile. Exhibit 37 is a copy of the First Check that was marked void. After receiving those 
checks I immediately began to investigate whether Mr. Millsap was using the Trust Account in 
violation of the Amendment. I discovered that he voided the First Check and in its stead caused two 
checks to be issued, the total amount of which equaled the amount of the First Check. One of the 
new checks was payable to Gren Development, Mr. Millsap's company, dated October 3, 2000, in 
the amount of $70,000 ("Second Check"), signed by Mr. Millsap, and the other check was payable 
to Pat Dixon dated October 3, 2000, in the amount of $11,281.91 ("Third Check"), also signed by 
Mr. Millsap. Copies of the Second Check and the Third Check are attached hereto as Exhibits 38 
and 39 respectively. 
20. I discovered Mr. Millsap's unauthorized uses of the Trust Account in connection with 
the Gren Account and Tippetts Closing on or about October 3, 2000. When I discovered his 
unauthorized uses of the Trust Account Mr. Millsap's employment with CCD was terminated on 
October 13,2000. Attached hereto as Exhibit 40 is a copy of a letter I sent to him dated November 3, 
2000, advising him of his rights to health insurance coverage pursuant to COBRA. On December 
12, 2000, acknowledging that his employment with CCD had been terminated, Mr. Millsap sent a 
letter addressed to Mr. Stanley and me requesting the continuation of his "coverage on the COBRA 
plan." Attached as Exhibit 41 is a copy of his letter. 
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100 16 
93,531 58 
200 Amounts paid By Or In Behalf Of Borrower 
201 OeposM or earnest money 
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Adjustment* for Items unpaid by seller 
210 City/Town Texos to 
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l 88 176 00 
I 5 355 58 
F Name and Aodre&s uf Londer 
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«w» STREET LIGHT INSTALLATION 
609 
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i 
' 81,271 91 
438 13 
150 00 
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2 655 00 
«00 turns Required By Lender To Be Paid In Advance 
1100 TIUaCTurqee 
iQO Item* Payable In Connection With Loan 
eoi Loan Origination Fee 1 % ST GEORGE FINANCIAL & INSURANCE CTR 
ao2 Loan Discount 0 875* fST GEORGE FINANCIAL A INSURANCE CTR 
ao3 Appraisal FM to KENT VINCENT 
004 oodii Report to CREDIT BUREAU OF SO UTAH 
805 Land*!'* Inspection Fee to 
806 Mortgage Insurance Application Fee to 
607 Assumption Fee to 
aoa TAX SERVICE FEE TO FMG $80 00 POC BY BROKER 
800 FLOOD CERT TO FDSI 
AIO UNDERWRITING FEE TO FMC 5425 00 POC BY BROKER 
an WIRE FEE TO FMC $20 00 POC BY BROKER 
ai2 BROKER PAID PROCESSING $150 00 










001 Interest from 10/2/00 to 10/1/00 
902 Mortgage insurance Premium (or months to 
003 Hazard Insurance Premium for 1 years to 
804 years 1° 
yot 






Reeerves Oepoaltad With Lander 
Hazard Inaurence 
MorlgaQA Insurance 































1101 Settlement or Closing Fee 
1102 Abstract or TMe Search 
1103 Title examination 
1104 Tine Insurance Binder 
1105 Document Preparation 
1108 Notary f-ees 
1107 Attorney's Fees 
(includes above items nuin 
1108 TUia insurance 
bar) 
(Indodos above Items number) 
1100 Lender's Coverage 















UNITED TITLE SERVICES INC 
UNITED TITLE SERVICES INC 
UNITED TITLE SERVICES INC 
87 776 00 
88 500 00 








1200 Government Recording and Transfer Ch«rg«« 
1201 Recording fee Deed $ 2 0 0 0 Mortgooe J 
1202 Ciry/Counry Ta* Stamps Deed S 





Release I 30 00 55 00 30 00 
1300 Additional Settlement Charge* 
1301 Survey 




TERMITE REPORT TO ST GEORGE FINANCIAl 
1400 Total Settlement Charges (enter on llntr 103 Section J »nd 602 Section K A 031 42 
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f o r <J«(«(!# • • « TMU IS U 3 C o d * f a c t i o n 10O1 **d 0 ,«<Um 1 0 t o ^ 
SCHEDULE A 
673-7733 
Order No. 11056 
Direct inquiries to 
DOUG STANLEY 
1. Effective Date August 25,2000 @ 8:00 AM 
2. Policy or Policies to be issued 
(a) A.L.T.A. Owner's 
Amount of Insurance 
$ 88,500.00 
Fee: $ 595.00 
Proposed insured: 
(b) A . L T A Lender 
NILTON L. T1PPETTS and ANGELA RAMSEY 
$ 87,776.00 
Fee: $ 354.00 
Proposed insured: 
(c) Endorsements: 
ST. GEORGE FINANCIAL 
100 116 8.1 Fee: $ 55.00 
3. The estate or interest \r\ the land described or referred to in this Commitment and covered herein is 
Fee Simple 
4 Title to the said estate or Interest in said land is at the effective date hereof vested in: 
SHELLY REYNOLDS-FORD, A MARRIED WOMAN 
5. The land referred to in this Commitment is described as follows: 
Lot 36, JCR MOBILE ESTATES SUBDIVISION, a Subdivision, according to the Official Plat thereof, 
on file in the Office of the Recorder of Washington County, State of Utah. 
For informational purposes only 
The Washington County Assessor shows the address of said property to be: 
1803 WEST 1300 NORTH 
ST. GEORGE, UT 84770 
SCHEDULE B - SECTION 1 
Order No. 11056 
REQUIREMENTS 
The following requirements must be met: 
(a) Pay the agreed amounts for the interest in the land and/or the mortgage to be insured. 
(b) Pay us the premiums, fees and charges for the policy, 
(c) Documents satisfactory to us creating the interest in the land and/or mortgage to be insured must be 
signed, delivered and recorded. 
(d) You must tell us in writing the name of anyone not referred to in this Commitment who will get an interest 
in the land or who will make a loan on the land. We may then make additional requirements or 
exceptions. 
(e) INSTRUCTIONS TO CLOSING OFFICER 
The following documentation is required to close and insure this transaction. 
1 Warranty deed from the vested owners on Schedule A to the proposed insured. 
2. Trust Deed to secure the new loan to be insured. 
3 Payment of Tax Sale shown as Exception No. 1. 
4. Reconveyance of Deed of Trust shown as Exception No. 6. 
(f) You must give us the following information: 
1. Any off record leases, surveys, etc. 
2. Statement (s) of identity, all parties. 
3 Other 
Please direct any inquiries concerning any of the above requirements to Doug Stanley prior to closing this 
transaction. 
Form 1756-B2 (revised July, 1972) 
Commitment, Schedule B-2 
SCHEDULE B - SECTION 2 
No. 11056 
EXCEPTIONS 
The policy or policies to be issued will contain exceptions to the following unless the same are disposed of to 
the satisfaction of the Company. 
PART I 
1 Taxes or assessments which are not shown as existing liens by the records of any taxing authority that 
levies taxes or assessments on real property or by the public records. 
2. Any facts, rights, interest, or claims which are not shown by the public records but which could be 
ascertained by an inspection of said land or by making inquiry of persons in possession thereof. 
3 Easements, claims of easement or encumbrances which are not shown by the public records. 
4 Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachments, or any other facts which a 
correct curvey would disclose, and which are not shown by public records. 
5 Unpatented mining claims; reservations or exceptions In patent or in Acts authorizing the issuance thereof; 
water rights; claims or title to water. 
6 Any lien, or right to a lien, for services, labor or material theretofore or hereafter furnished, imposed by law 
and not shown by the public records. 




1. A Sale to Washington County for taxes for the year 1999; amount of sale $394.51, plus interest, penalty 
and costs. Entered in Tax Sale Book for the year 1999. Tax Parcel No. SG^)CR-36. 
2. Taxes or Assessments which are not shown as existing liens by the Official Washington County 
Records. This Policy does not include a search of the Special Assessment Records of ST. GEORGE 
City, and Ownership of said property Is subject to any Assessment by said Municipality for Curb and 
Gutter, Street Improvement, Sewer, Sidewalk, Water, Etc. 
3. EASEMENT AS DELINEATED and/or DEDICATED ON THE RECORDED PLAT: 
Purpose: Public Utilities and Drainage Easement 
Affects: Oyer the Northerly and Southerly 7.5 feet 
4. Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions and/or Easements, Except those based on race, color, creed 
religon, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin to extent such Covenants, Conditions or 
Restrictions violate 42 USC 3604 (C), contained in instrument. 
Recorded: MARCH 24, 1975 
Entry No.: 166645 
Book/Page: 169/104 
AMENDMENT TO SAID COVENANTS: 
Recorded: OCTOBER 17,1980 
Entry No.: 221192 
Book/Page: 279/223 
AMENDMENT TO SAID COVENANTS: 
Recorded: MARCH 12, 1981 
Entry No.: 225469 
Book/Page: 286/581 
AMENDMENT TO SAID COVENANTS: 
Recorded: MARCH 12,1981 
Entry Ho.: 225470 
Book/Page: 286/583 
AMENDMENT TO SAID COVENANTS: 
Recorded: MAY 26, 1981 
Entry No.: 227721 
Book/Page: 290/309 
AMENDMENT TO SAID COVENANTS: 
Recorded: JUNE 22,1981 
Entry No.: 228446 
Book/Page: 291/534 
(Continued) 




Excepting therefrom ail oil, gas and/or other minerals in, on or under said land, together with the right 
of ingress and egress for the purpose of exploring and/or removing the same. 
DEED OF TRUST 
Trustor: SHELLY A. GLAUS 
Trustee: UNITED TITLE SERVICES OF UTAH, INC. 
Beneficiary: PAT DIXON 
Amount: $82,000.00 
Dated: JULY 8,1994 
Recorded: JULY 8,1994 
Entry No.: 472580 
Book/Page: 834/135 
STREET LIGHT INSTALLATION AGREEMENT 
By and Between: THE CITY OF ST. GEORGE 
Dated: MARCH 25,1998 
Recorded: MARCH 2, 1999 
Entry No.: 638281 
Book/Page: 1320/328 
EASEMENT AND CONDITIONS CONTAINED THEREIN: 
Grantor: SHELLY A. GLAUS 
Grantee: CITY OF ST. GEORGE, A UTAH MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 
Location: The West 7.5 feet of Lot 36, JCR Mobile Estates Subdivision as platted 
in the Washington County Recorder's Office 
Purpose: An easement 7.5 feet in width to construct, install, use, operate, inspect 
repair, maintain, replace and remove utility lines 
Dated: JULY 31,1999 
Recorded: AUGUST 19, 1999 
Entry No.: 659111 
Book/Page: 1344/324 
Judgments have been searched only in the names of SHELLY REYNOLDS-FORD, NILTON L. 
TIPPETTS, ANGELA RAMSEY, and no other variations thereof, for the eight years last past and none 
were found. 
NOTE: Any matter in dispute between you and the underwriter, (The "COMPANY") concerning the 
policy or policies issued pursuant to this commitment may be subject to arbitration as an alternative 
to court action, pursuant to the rules of the American Arbitration Association or other recognized 
Arbitrator, a copy of which is available upon request from the company. Any decision reached by 
arbitration shall be binding upon both you and the company. The arbitration award may include 
Attorney's Fees and may be entered as a judgment in any court of proper jurisdiction. 
NOTE: A minimum Cancellation Fee of $120.00 will be due and payable if no Title Policy has been 
issued within 90 days following receipt of this report. Said Cancellation Fee, when paid, will be applied 
as a credit toward the premium charges on the Title Insurance Policy issued in connection with this 
Commitment within six (6) months of the date of this Commitment. 
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4 2 BOO 
UNITED TITLE SERVICES 
TRUST ACCOUNT 
229 e. ST. GEORGE BLVD., SUITE 200 
ST. GEORGE. UTAH a4770 
3AY TO THE 
DFIDGR OF P A T D I X O N 
E I G H T Y O N E T H O U S A N O T W O H U N D R E D S E V E N T Y O N E A N D 81/100 
PAT D t X O N 
211 N O R T H 2 0 0 W E S T 
K A N A B , U T 84761 
ZJONS FTRGT NATIONAL S A N K 
ST. GGOOCC OFFICE 4Q CAST 3 T . GdO^aE OLVO. 
ST. QEOftOC. UTAH *«770 t-8©O-7»«-Z206 
Octobe; H. 20O0 
s 
DCcL-ARS 
nose LB P A Y O F F & R E L E A S E T R U S T D E E D {/ J if 
*'OU E & Q Q H - i ! ; i B L o a o 0 5 i i i ; 0 3 L 1 3 S T 5 & B W 
NTTED T I T L E S E R V I C E S 
P A Y O F F & R E L E A S E T R U S T D E E D 
Date: 10/2/OO 
Pttyoe: PAT D I X O N 
Property: 1803 W E S T 1300 N O R T H S T . G E O R G E U T 84770 
Buyer: T I P P E T T S . N I L T O N I.. Seller: R E Y N O L D S - F O R D , S H E L L Y 
Closer: LB FIleNo; 1T056 Escrow: 11056 
31,271.91 
N E T A M O U N T : 81 .271.91 
03/11/02 M0N 11:28 ITX/RX NO 5457 1 
IP 
® 
U K f r E O T I T L E SE-RVICES 
TRUST ACCOUNT 
220 E. ST. GEORGE BLVD.. SUITE 200 
ST. GEORGE. UTAH 84770 
ZION3 HflST NATlCfJAL SA£ 
8!\ OEORG6 OFRCe 40 CAST ST. QfcC '/BLVD. 
ST. GEOfWC l/TAH W770 l-eOO'fttl^W 
3* > 
4260C 





EIGHTY ONE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE ANO S 
PAT DIXON 
211 NORTH 200 WEST 
KANAB, UT M7M 
MEMO 
CATE 
OctaV. *••;'/, 2000 
11056 LB PAYOFF & RELEASE TRUST DEED / 
AUTVlORirS5jS)QKcVl L/^T" 
UNITED TITLE SERVICES 
PAYOFF t, f iELEASE TRUST OEED 
Date: 10/2/00 
Payca; PAT DIXON 
Property: 1d03 WEST 1300 NORTH ST. GEORGE UT B4770 
Buy«r. TIPPETTS. NILTON L. Seller: REYNOLDS-FORD. SHELLY 





0 3 / 1 1 / 0 2 M0N 1 1 : 2 8 (T.X/RX NO .1457 | 
UNITED TITLE SERVICES 
TRUST ACCOUNT 
229 E. ST, GEORGE BLVD., SUITE 200 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770 
PAY TO THE 
ORDER OF QREN DEVELOPMENT 
; S* SEVENTY THOUSAND AND NO/100 
ST. GEORGE OFFICE 40 EAST ST. GEOFk ,VD. 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770 1-800-789-2266 
31-6/1240 
34 
4 £ 0 J . f 
MEMO 
GREN DEVELOPMENT 
ST. GEORGE, UT 84770 
DATE 




11056 LB LOAN FROM PAT DIXON 
H'Qi^&avn1 IQ31 ,000051*1: aai« l i ^ s t a * 
AUTHORiZgl SIGNATURE" 7 V 




3 r , t : i |8^9^/898650 MILLB >124392938< 11881917 
:12§W12 







03/11/02 MON 11:28 ITX/RX NO 5457 1 
UNITED TITLE SERVICES 
TRUST ACCOUNT 
229 E ST. GEORGE BLVO , SUITE 200 
ST. GEORGE, UTAH 84770 
ZiONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
ST GEORGE OFFICE 40 EAST ST GEORGE BLVO 





October 3, 2000 
PAY TO THE 
ORDER OF PAT DIXON 
ELEVEN THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY ONE AND 91/100 




211 NORTH 200 WEST 
KANAB, UT 84761 
11056 LB PAYOFF & RELEASE TRUST DEED 
H'Qi.c'&i&H- it.* 2 1 , 0 0 0 0 5UI : 0 3U i 3 S 5 & an1 
a*^ 
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